

- in excess of certain, specified numbers of total exercises or movements per year
- limitations or bans on specified threatening types of weapon tests (multiple ICBM test launches, large scale bomber exercises, MaRV test flights)
- equipment constraints limiting or prohibiting the placement of specified types and/or numbers of (often) "offensive" equipment such as bridging equipment and attack aircraft
- nuclear free zones where no nuclear delivery vehicles are permitted

C - Declaratory Measures

- a controversial category which, if counted in this general analysis of CBMs, would include "no first use" declarations and other statements of benign intent which, by their nature, are impossible to verify or otherwise confirm (short of their non-occurrence)

Having more or less resolved the definitional problems associated with Confidence-Building, we then turned our attention to the analytic failings of the Confidence-Building literature and, by inference, the failings of most Confidence-Building thinking. On the basis of a detailed examination of the literature, a specific list of problems was developed. According to this analysis, the Confidence-Building literature and Confidence-Building thinking more generally tended to exhibit the following generic problems:

1. an indifference to - or an unwillingness to address - the complex, idiosyncratic and apparently very offensive substance of Soviet defence policy, military doctrine, and conventional military capabilities;
2. a frequent failure to understand or appreciate what the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies consider to be genuine military threats and "legitimate" concerns;
3. a frequent failure to perform, rely upon, include or even refer to detailed critical analyses of the actual character of the

NATO-WTO military balance, its dynamics and the sorts of threats that each side poses - actually as well as potentially - for the other and for third parties;

4. an insensitivity to the various factors - domestic and external, unilateral and interactive - that shape military policy, define its historical context, explain its contemporary character and determine its susceptibility to change;
5. a consistent failure to explicitly discuss the actual psychological processes that are assumed to (a) mediate or facilitate the creation of "confidence" and (b) overcome the "misperception" of intentions and ambiguous actions;
6. a general failure to appreciate the ramifications of the fact that Confidence-Building is an intrinsically psychological process (i.e. there is a stunning disregard for the intellectual and emotional distortions that cognitive processes can wreak on perceptions of "trust", "predictability", "confidence", and "certainty" - all vital features of meaningful Confidence-Building);
7. a general interest in somehow rendering intentions "transparent" but no concrete, realistic explanation of just how this can be achieved, nor any serious (theoretical) discussion of why it ought to be attempted;
8. a general tendency to assume that increased amounts of accurate information will lead to a better grasp of adversary intentions and, as a consequence, relaxed anxieties;
9. a marked indifference to the bureaucratic and organizational realities that necessarily restrict the scope for change in any state's national security policy.

This unwieldy list of complaints was then reduced to a more manageable size by collapsing the nine into two super categories:

1. Inadequate assessments of Soviet conventional military forces and the nature of the threat that they actually pose;

