

against another Power or a combination of other Powers, and that without any aggression on her part, requires no argument to make it plain. When that occasion comes, a vigilant and prepared foe may reasonably be expected to strike at a vulnerable part of the Imperial body. What point more vulnerable than our navyless Atlantic and St. Lawrence seaports ?

But Europe and its political complications are not the whole of Canada's possible embarrassment, perhaps not even the principal part. Our Western possessions realise acutely, even now, the great Asiatic immigration problems which the recent history of China and Japan may force upon us. Leaving out of the question the treaty between Great Britain and Japan, and the possible difficulties in our scheme of self-government which it may introduce, we must recognise the peculiar peril in which we stand if Japan, the most recent addition to important world-powers, should insist upon full recognition by us of her new status. Japan's attitude is that she has fought her way into the realm of national recognition. She is sensitive to a degree, and may shortly be found claiming, as an Eastern nation, rights of re-immigration and intercourse upon a Western basis. Suppose that Japan desires to foster the emigration of her subjects. We are conversely inviting immigration. But we will not have it from Asia. One need not be an alarmist in any sense to feel and realise that the situation may easily become critical. It must not be forgotten that further complications arise out of the existing treaty, and while the present Canadian arrangement has, at all events partially, composed Japanese irritation for the time, there is manifested by the Japanese people a disposition to evade the arrangement, and there is a clear feeling of dissatisfaction with it among our own people, accompanied by an unrest and agitation which are at least disturbing. Again, we look for the vulnerable spot, and find it in our navyless Pacific seaboard. Do we not need a protective equipment there ?

Upon the whole, it seems impossible to reject the conclusion that Canada should, for Canadian reasons, have a navy ; having regard to the functions of a naval equipment, our geographical and trade conditions and our relations, actual and possible, to the outside world.

The questions of method and cost remain to be considered, and may be conveniently treated together. On the one hand, we do not want a mere toy ; on the other, the conditions do not call for a fleet composed of Dreadnoughts and of Imperial dimensions.