

petent administrator. He is a brilliant man with great wit, charm and real charisma.

The rebuilding of the Chinese Communist Party may help provide a modicum of stability and a better constitutional and political base for the continuity of Chou's essentially moderate policies of state-building. It is also the prerequisite to whatever preparations are being made for a smooth succession. If China, with a fairly stable party at the helm, is given a few years of relative political quiet, continued economic development and even a fraction of its recent success in international trade and diplomacy, some type of collective leadership, which now appears to be the solution envisaged in Peking, may be feasible.

The past two or three years have also seen a swing back to more orthodox models of development and pragmatic policies of economic production. Economic decentralization, motivated as much by demographic, social and military concerns as by economic ones, is likely to remain a cornerstone of Chinese Communist Party policy. However, recent trends have revealed Peking's desire to escape the problems of excessive decentralization by placing more emphasis on the larger regional, rather than local, unit for purposes of planning, co-ordination and capital expenditure. In industry the swing from "Red" to "expert" continues, marked by a greater stress on managerial control. At the production level, work points are being given for work performance rather than political attitudes, and greater room is being provided for material incentives now labelled "reasonable rewards".

Foreign, economic policy links

In foreign policy, China's extraordinary international initiatives in the Seventies have been largely motivated by Peking's near-obsessive concern with the alleged "socialist imperialism" of the Soviet Union. But, both as cause and effect, China's new international position also has a vitally important relation with its accelerated efforts at achieving a more rapid pace of economic development. And yet herein lies another contradiction, for, the more closely-linked China's own economy becomes to the forces of the world market, the more difficult it will be for Peking to sustain the same political priorities.

To what extent will increased purchases of whole plants, and the use of deferred payments, erode the commitment to the nation's most proudly boasted socialist ethic — "self-reliance"? Will the more rapid modernization of Chinese industry, increasingly dependent upon trade

with Japan and the West, affect agrarian policies? To what extent also might gradually disrupt one of the present levels of social and economic equality and stability — the over-employment apparent throughout much of the industrial and service components of the Chinese economy?

Will China's concern with development too great a dependence upon the inflation-ridden economies of the West and Japan force it to diversify its trade, placing more emphasis on the Eastern bloc, with possible far-reaching consequences in its foreign policy?

Possible ideological confrontations

These are all imponderables. The point is that all these policies and shifts in policy emphasis create tensions between the thrust toward modernization and the commitment to revolution. Will they lead to renewed ideological confrontation within the leadership? Did the striking contrast between the speeches of Chou En-lai and Wang Hung-wen at the Tenth Party Congress foreshadow precisely this? Will an accelerated pace of modernization provoke again the need to rekindle the fires of revolution?

The swing away from the more radical policies of the GPCR, particularly during the past year, has been equally striking in other areas. In literature, a wider variety of offerings has emerged, including the reappearance of some traditional novels. In the arts, "socialist realism" no longer has a stranglehold on theme and form. Although Madame Mao's "revolutionary model operas" still hold sway in that field, the resurgence of traditional Chinese music and, in Peking, Shanghai and Canton, concerts by Western symphonies have afforded greater cultural diversions for some Chinese. The Party's theoretical journal *Red Flag* has called for a greater variety in "life-styles" and the increase of color in clothes, and even hair-styling, among urban women suggest a more relaxed social environment generally. In education, general retreat from the high point of revolutionary change has been noticeable over the past year, with less emphasis on political criteria for university admissions, more stress on examinations and an opening of the shortened university programs. These trends are being challenged. Here, in particular, the ideological debates continue to rage. Will they culminate again one day in a major upheaval of Cultural Revolution proportions?

One leaves China after more than a year's residence with a deeper appreciation of the extraordinary achievements of the Chinese Revolution. And yet one al-

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