

by lavishing too many votes on an exceedingly popular candidate would fail to elect the number of representatives that it was entitled to; or, by distributing its votes over too many candidates, might even fail to elect any one of them. This brings us to the second point. We should then adopt a voting system known as the single transferable vote.

Q. Why would you?—A. I am coming to that. Under this system each elector shall have one vote, and one vote only, but that single vote shall, under certain contingencies, be transferable from one candidate to another as the elector himself shall decide when marking his ballot. This system of voting at once makes it possible to effect a just and proper distribution of the representation among all the more important political parties in proportion to their voting strength; and it further insures that the best man of each party shall be elected. Perhaps I had better repeat this. The first step—the combining together of several adjoining single member constituencies into one large electoral district electing several members. The second step—the use of the single transferable vote, that is, each elector shall have one vote, but that one vote shall be transferable under certain contingencies from one candidate to another in strict accordance with the voter's wishes: In order to illustrate this let us take the city of Toronto as it was divided in 1911 for the federal elections. Toronto furnishes a good example; I might have taken Quebec, but perhaps Toronto furnishes the best illustration for my purpose. In 1911, Toronto was divided up into five single member constituencies. There were about 50,000 voters in the city at that time of which 30,000 approximately were Conservatives and 20,000 were Liberals. The Conservatives were in the majority in each of the five constituencies and elected all five members. Under proportional representation Toronto would be considered as one large electoral district electing five members. Then by using the single transferable vote the 50,000 voters at that time in Toronto would have been able to group themselves into five groups of approximately 10,000, each group, or "quota," electing one member, so that the 30,000 Conservatives would have formed three groups and elected three members, and the 20,000 Liberals would have formed two groups and elected two members. As I have explained the Conservatives elected all five members. This illustration might work the other way in the province of Quebec.

By Hon. Mr. Calder:

Q. Do you advocate the grouping of rural constituencies in the same way?—A. That of course depends to a certain extent upon circumstances. The least that it is advisable to have for a proportional representation constituency is three members. By grouping three sparsely populated rural constituencies you might make a large area and practical considerations might make that inadvisable. It depends on the density of population.

Q. See where you land yourself. In Toronto, in the election of 1911, there were 30,000 Conservatives and 20,000 Liberals, and you say that the system should be so arranged that each of those large groups should get their representation so far as the city is concerned; but when you come to rural constituencies you may find exactly the same difference, so many Liberals and so many Conservatives. Would it be proper to adopt the system that you advocate in the cities when you would find it inadvisable to use it in the country constituencies under the circumstances you mention?—A. If it be admitted for a moment that the present system is unjust—

By Mr. Currie:

Q. But it is not. You are attacking our present system and you must justify that statement.—A. I can do so by starting at the beginning as I understood was the original intention of this morning's session.

Q. First of all it is necessary to prove that. We had better go into the fundamentals before proceeding to discuss your proposition. Allow me to ask you a few
[Mr. Ronald H. Hooper.]