

being against the principle of that measure and he censured those who were in favour of the contribution. However, on that same day, a vote was being taken in this House, and we can see in the 'Hansard' that Mr. Monk, being absent, had been paired. If he had voted, he would then have voted with those who were proposing the adoption of that measure, the better to carry the contribution which he so strongly denounces.

How logical is such conduct, for an ex-minister of this Government! But his colleagues, the Nationalist members, who had so much confidence in the Prime Minister, where was that valiant phalanx on votation day? Not all, but a good number whom we know very well, kept themselves hidden in the lobbies.

I will now conclude, because Mr. Speaker beckons to me that my time is up. I conclude in saying that I will vote against the Bill, and I declare again that I am in favour of a navy based on the resolution of the 29th of March, 1909, a navy built, manned and operated by the Canadian Parliament.

Mr. W. F. COCKSHUTT (Brantford): The matter of the cost of a Canadian navy has caused a great deal of discussion as to what can be done in Canada, and much has been said in this connection with regard to Australia. I wish to read to the committee an article from the National Review of February last, which shows the position in which Australia is at the present moment:

But since 1909 the fleet unit policy has gone by the board—at any rate so far as Australia is concerned. The Commonwealth Government probably never pretended that either the local ambitions or the Imperial sentiment of the Australian people would be satisfied with four cruisers and six destroyers. That provision was manifestly inadequate for the protection of Australian maritime commerce. Moreover, the general supremacy of the British navy in the armament race in Europe was, on paper, steadily deteriorating, and the 'more dreadnoughts' agitation agreement was no sooner accepted than it was discarded. It was not enough. The Government ordered the actual building of the proposed ships, but, impelled by popular enthusiasm, it announced that something further must be done and requested the Admiralty to send out a naval expert to advise on the foundation of a local navy of considerably larger proportions. This expert, Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, went out in 1910 and presented his recommendations early in the following year. He examined almost the entire Australian coastline, for he was to report not merely on the number of ships required, but also on the proper equipment of harbours and coast defence and the enrolment and training of seamen. His lucid and exhaustive report was promptly adopted by the Commonwealth Government. He advocated the building of eight first-class cruisers (im-

proved invincibles), ten protected cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and twelve submarines, which with four depot and repair ships make a fleet of fifty-two. The personnel required he estimated as 15,000. The cost of construction is 23½ millions sterling, spread over a period of twenty-two years. Adding on to this, however, the expenditure on maintenance, personnel and reserves, the Bill is £73,275,000 for that period, and there is, further, the outlay on naval works and harbours, which has been estimated at as much as £15,000,000—though the Minister for Defence recently denied that it would reach that figure. Taking the £15,000,000, however, for the moment as correct, the cost of the Australian naval policy under the Henderson scheme becomes £88,000,000, or an average of \$4,000,000 annually. Admiral Henderson has drawn up a financial table, in which the yearly charge begins at about £2,500,000 and rises rapidly to nearly £5,000,000 in the ultimate year.

Our friends opposite have mentioned Australia as an example, and have said that Canada should follow in her footsteps. How do you like the expenditure? The hon. member for St. John (Mr. Pugsley) has, without a doubt, preached the gospel of St. John, but that gospel contains no salvation for the defence of the British Empire. In the gospel of St. John, which has been expounded by the hon. gentleman day in and day out for twenty days—I think the hon. gentleman must have spoken at least twenty-five times on the subject—what has the hon. member said about the question of Imperial naval defence? It has not been mentioned. The expression of certain sentimental ideas which the hon. gentleman has with regard to harbour works and ship-building at St. John is about all we have heard. I saw a cartoon in a recent issue of the Globe, which I think gives a very good idea of the smallness of the policy advocated by the hon. member for St. John. A restaurant keeper, depicted as serving an order of beefsteak and potatoes to one of his customers, produced a dish upon which there was a very large potato and a very small beefsteak. The steak was entirely covered by the potato. A few minutes later the manager of the restaurant came around and asked the customer: 'How did you find the beefsteak?' 'Oh,' he said, 'that was easy; I simply lifted the potato and there it was!' This is what the hon. member for St. John had been doing: he is lifting the potato—the interests of the city of St. John—and there he finds Imperial defence. But what this country wants is not a policy that is good only for the city of St. John. I believe in the up-building of all Canadian industries. We are all glad to see the city of St. John thriving, but it is begging the question to ask Canada to submerge this great question of Imperial defence under the requirements of the city of St. John, great as it is.