

VI POLITICAL OBSTACLES

- (i) **Body bags.** Casualties to national military personnel have been the greatest obstacle to effective U.N. actions to halt the recent killings in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Also the killing of 18 U.S. military personnel in Somalia prompted a major public uproar which led President Clinton to set a termination date for the deployment of U.S. forces in that country.
- The proposed U.N. constabulary would to some extent alleviate this problem. Members of the constabulary would be individually recruited, highly-trained for intervention, well-educated, with decent salaries and benefits, including post-police career opportunities and retirement funds. These individuals would be international civil servants. Rather than being appointed by their governments, they would apply for these positions directly, just as individuals apply to join the local police force in Toledo, Harare, or Kyoto. No more than 3-5 per cent of the personnel should come from any one member state. There will be no nationally organized units within the force, and citizens from each member state should be dispersed as widely as possible throughout the force. Casualties need not raise issues of national interest, national security, or injury to the state of any kind. Nor would they provoke the kind of nationalist sentiments and hostile backlash that swept through U.S. public opinion when U.S. soldiers were killed in Somalia.
- (iii) **Sovereignty.** States fear that any U.N. police force might be used against the interests of a member state, and that this would erode the general principle of state sovereignty. States fear that the U.N. might intervene directly into their own territory, thereby undermining their own sovereignty quite specifically.
- While the problem of undermining sovereignty will be to some extent addressed by the proposed multinational structure of the constabulary, all substantial progress in international peacekeeping implies a certain pooling of sovereignty as argued in chapter 7.
- (iv) **Finance.** Proposals for various type of international rapid reaction forces range considerably both in force size and in cost. In a recent, thorough analysis of the problem, George Rathjens and Carl Kaysen conclude that a force of 15,000 would allow 10,600 deployable personnel and 4,400 support staff (including training, logistics, and headquarters staff). Such a force, they argue, could send out two contingents simultaneously while keeping a third contingent in reserve. Rathjens and Kaysen calculate the cost of such a force at \$1.5 billion annually.⁶