

and the Euro-Atlantic area.

Territorial Conflict

One issue that animated much European discourse on security after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was the possible resurgence of territorial conflict. The number of potential *irredenta* was impressive in 1991 and included potential disputes between Latvia and Russia, Estonia and Russia, Poland and Lithuania, Germany and Poland, Poland and the then Czecho-Slovakia, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary (over rights in the Danube watercourse), Hungary and Rumania, Bulgaria and Macedonia, Bulgaria and Rumania, Ukraine and Slovakia, Ukraine and Poland, Ukraine and Hungary and Ukraine and Rumania, not to mention the numerous territorial issues enlivening relations among the CIS states.

It is striking after ten years of post-Cold War reality how little actual conflict has emerged out of the rather messy post-World War II (and post-Soviet collapse) territorial dispensations. Most of the outstanding territorial issues mentioned above have been resolved by treaty, or by unilateral renunciation even in instances when the historical basis of the claim was quite sound (as, for example, with Estonian claims on Russia). The challenge here was not merely one of deterring deliberate assaults by one European state on another and convincing potential revisionists of the illegitimacy of territorial change, but also of preventing the emergence of security dilemmas between states facing such potential disputes, and inadvertent (preventive or pre-emptive) war emerging from such dilemmas. The temptations for leaders facing rapid political and economic transition to sustain and build support through the manipulation of nationalism increased the danger.²¹

One factor explaining this positive outcome has been the OSCE norm concerning territorial integrity and the inviolability of internationally recognised frontiers, which was strongly reiterated in the 1999 Istanbul Security Charter. CSBMs and arms control measures worked out in part in the FSC also played an important role in stabilizing these potential disputes. The very existence of the FSC symbolises the community's commitment to the building of a cooperative security environment and is reassuring in this sense. The FSC also contributes as a transmitter of norms regarding the non-use of force in territorial disputes. The increasing transparency associated with CSBMs reduces states' sense of insecurity and enhances predictability, thereby mitigating the "security dilemmas" of states involved in such disputes. However, the key here was probably the desire of these states to enter European institutions, notably NATO and the EU. In order to make a credible case for doing so, they have had to get their houses in order. Both institutions have made it clear that they would not seriously consider a membership application by a state with unresolved territorial claims or disputes with their neighbours.

²¹ On this danger, see Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* XX, No. 1 (Summer 1995).