

ican policy is developed through a sort of permanent great power conference between the political interest groups in Washington, notably the State Department, the White House and the Department of Defense. If the allies have a clear, collective view, they can nearly always swing the argument in their favour. We had an example of this only in the last week. Mr. McFarlane had made a statement which very much worried the allies about re-interpreting the ABM Treaty so as to permit the testing and even deployment of a strategic defence system, but allied protest led Mr. Shultz to win that battle and to be able to make a statement in San Francisco a few days ago, in which McFarlane was thrown out of the window, at least for a few days, and loyalty to the ABM Treaty was re-established.

Perhaps that is the one point on which I should end. Too often, I think, we tend to look on these problems from outside and to feel that ignorant armies are clashing by night and we are only the victims. The fact is that, in the Western system — I wish some time it might be true of the Eastern system — it is possible for allies who are trusted in Washington to have a very important influence on American policy, providing they carry their share of the can and providing they are united. One of the reasons why I was so glad to come here, in the interstice of a fairly busy life, is that your Institute and this conference are intended, I hope, to try to produce this type of influence.