

always being told, and delight to hear it, that we have swept the Russian navy from the sea, have reduced her ships, like the reptiles which fell under the curse of St. Patrick, to "commit suicide to save themselves from slaughter," crippled her commerce, blockaded her ports, damaged her export and ruined her import trade. These things we rejoice to have done, but we are a little inclined to forget that the very enemy whom we have so treated has retaliated upon us, not, certainly, to the same extent, but still in a degree perceptibly injurious and unpleasant. The heavy fall of rain which has arrived at this, the most critical period of the year, comes to remind us that by the war the area from which we derive our supplies of wheat is considerably diminished. We are reminded by the rain that it is about this season of the year that the potato blight has on previous occasions manifested itself, and that a few heavy showers now may do an amount of injury which may have an important effect upon the price of food for the coming year. A bad harvest and an insufficient supply of grain from foreign countries would inflict upon us in time of peace calamities quite as great and greater than those which we have hitherto experienced from war. With cheap food we may well continue to pay war taxes; with dear food our state becomes almost intolerable, even without taking into consideration one farthing of extra expense for the war. We do not presume to prophecy that this is likely to be the case; we only wish to point out that it may be so, and that we should be unpardonable if we left any means untried for averting so serious a result. We cannot, indeed, regulate the capricious varieties of our climate any more than we can force upon the great mass of our agriculturist the adoption of that system of high farming which will yield to us the greatest abundance, and render us most independent of the vicissitudes of the seasons; but it would seem that there is something within our power to render food more abundant, and increase the limited supply to which we are obliged to trust.

If we exclude Russia from the Baltic and the Euxine, there can be no doubt she excludes us just as effectually from the produce of the rich valley of the Danube and of the southern provinces of her empire by her control over the Sulina mouth. There are enormous stocks of grain locked up within that river, of which Russia holds the key. Why have we not attempted to open our way into this vast reservoir of food, and to liberate the produce of these fertile countries from the embargo which our antagonist has laid upon them? This must arise from one or two causes—either we are of opinion that such an enterprise is impossible, or that, if possible, it is not worth the trouble of undertaking. As to the possibility of the enterprise, there may, of course, be reasons of which we know nothing, which may prevent our fleets from attempting it, but would cer-

tainly seem to ordinary apprehensions as if there were no overwhelming difficulty in forcing the entrance of the Danube, and asserting the same supremacy over its waters as we have already established over the Euxine and Sea of Azoff. With the co-operation of a land force, and with the probability, almost amounting to a certainty, that the extreme need in which the Russians have found themselves of sending every available man to the Crimea has reduced their garrisons in this quarter far below the point of efficiency, no enterprise would appear more promising—and more can never be said in war—than the attempt to give back to commerce this noble stream, and to silence the batteries that threaten the freedom of its waters. We cannot avoid the suspicion that something of the kind would have been attempted long ago, with the very ample means placed at our disposal, had it not been for the fear of offending that power which has contrived to possess herself of the Principalities, but evinces no very strong desire to open the readiest access to them to the fleets and armies of the allies. However this may be, we apprehend that there are the strongest reasons, military and commercial, why such an attempt should be made. In a military point of view the assent of the Danube by the allied flotilla, and the attack of the fortresses on its banks by such forces as could be spared to co-operate with the Turks, would not only hold out a very reasonable prospect of success, but would certainly operate as a very powerful diversion. We have hitherto voluntarily denied to ourselves the advantage which we might attain by attacking Russia on many different points, distracting her attention, dividing her forces, and wearing them out by constant marches and countermarches. Now that Austria and Prussia have relieved our enemy from any apprehensions as to their possible hostility, Russia is free to concentrate all her forces, except those required to guard the shores of the Baltic from purely attack, on the defence of Sebastopol. We leave Asia Minor to its fate, the Danube blocked up, Odessa untenable, and even our unexampled success in the Sea of Azoff has failed as yet to inspire us with courage to repeat the operation elsewhere.

If we turn to the commercial side of the question, hitherto entirely overlooked, the argument appears no less cogent. This corn thus shut up from us is, in fact, one of the munitions of war—one of the things most requisite to enable us to carry it out to a successful conclusion. If bread be cheap we can pay war taxes with resignation, and even with patience; if it become dear, that dearness alone constitutes a burthen extremely hard to be borne. We have attracted an enormous trade to the Black Sea, but it is a commerce entirely one side; the ships go out with stores and provisions for the use of the army, but they return in ballast. Surely no inconsiderable object would be gained if, instead of coming back empty,

they could bring back in their holds the golden harvests of those sunny climates, and thus at once assist in feeding our people and relieving us from the heavy freights that we are now compelled to pay. We have in this war looked at everything from too exclusively a military point of view, and have been slow to avail ourselves of private enterprise in improving our military resources, or of the commercial spirit of the nation in supplying the necessities of our troops. It is time this should be changed, and no step would be so likely to produce that change as re-opening to Western Europe the trade of the Danubian Principalities, from which, notwithstanding our boasted possession of the sea, the war has so entirely excluded us. The question deserves more consideration than it appears to have received, and bears very forcibly upon another which must shortly receive a peremptory solution—the question how long we shall be disposed to permit Austria to maintain the occupation of these territories, setting free the Russian army for service in the Crimea, embarrassing any offensive operations in the Principalities, and facilitating to Russia, by covering the right flank of any force she may possess on the left bank of the Danube, the possession of the Sulina mouth, and the exclusion of the allies from that corn trade from which they ought to derive so many advantages.—*London Times*.

#### WEATHER AND CROPS IN ENGLAND.

*Derbyshire*.—It is too early to form even a tolerably correct opinion as to the wheat produce; but it is not too much to say, not disregarding the apparent difference in the crops, in various situations, that it will scarcely be an average. Wonders have been wrought in the growth of turnips, and in many instances, little is left to be desired; while potatoes scarce ever looked more promising.—*Derbyshire Courier*.

*Westmoreland*.—Should the weather be favorable, the hay harvest will become general about the middle of next week. Corn and potatoes are looking excellent, and promise an early harvest, the corn being quite shot in the ear on the banks of Lake Windermere. Turnips on the whole, are not looking so very well at present.—*Kendal Mercury*.

*Bedfordshire*.—Never did the wheat crops present a more splendid appearance.—Barley and Oats have grown rapidly and are fast maturing for the scythe. The former already begins to change its color, and will be ready to cut at an earlier period than what has been presaged. Potatoes never looked better.—*Bedford Times*.

*Dorsetshire*.—The beautiful weather during the last fortnight has enabled the growers of hay to secure it in excellent condition, which will more than compensate for the lightness of the crop, complained of in many places. We scarcely remember a more favorable crop than that of the present season. Corn of all kinds looks remarkably