

## A Warning voice from the Spanish Armada.

BY MAJOR GENERAL T. B. COLLINSON, R.E.

(Continued from page 364.)

Comparison with Present Force.

But what a lesson this is to all rulers of the British empire, on the defence of the islands of Great Britain itself. There were men enough then, with strength and spirit enough in them to make a very fair resistance to the landing and advance of any invading army, if they had been embodied, and trained, and disciplined, and armed in time: and if the practice of the bow had not been allowed to die out, before that of the new firearms commenced. As it was, if by any accident the invaders got clear of the British fleet, there was nothing that could be called a serious obstacle, to stop them from capturing London. *If that same proportion of one twenty fifth of the whole population, was now trained, it would give a force of one million, which would be sufficient to place 350 men per mile round the coast of England.* And if the favourable landing places were prepared beforehand with cover for the defenders and obstacles against the invaders, and the men were armed and well trained with breech loading rifles, that number would go a very great way towards defeating altogether, any attempt at landing by the greatest possible force that could land on a given distance. It would be a force like the ancient county Militia, levied, trained, and fighting at the places they lived in, and would, therefore, tend more than any other, to keep up the martial spirit of the people. But it is evident from this part of the story of the Spanish Armada, that if any dependence is to be placed on any such force, it must be so organised, that there will be no fear that they will not always be accustomed to discipline, and well trained in the use of the rifle: and I think, after what we have heard, it would not be a amiss to add, that they should at least while embodied, be well fed.

And what proportion of that armed million of Englishmen, are we prepared to raise on such an emergency? 130,000 partly trained militia, and 150,000 volunteers, who, as their title implies, may come or stay as they please. For the rest of the security of our great empire, we depend on 150,000 regular troops, who are just enough to occupy our military posts over the world in peace time; and to reinforce whom on the outbreak of war we have at the most about 30,000 old soldiers. Thus, taking the favourable view that all those numbers would be forthcoming on sudden demand, we have under 500,000 men, or one half of the proportion of the population considered necessary in 1588; and to defend an empire, probably twenty times as great. The security of our dependencies, none of which existed in those days, would now absorb the whole power of those 150,000 regular soldiers, leaving our own shores to be defended by a force of militia and volunteers one third the strength of what the founders of our empire would have raised.

### Cost of Land Forces.

The cost of all the forces and all the preparations made on land for the Armada, cannot be easily obtained, if at all; because the bulk of it was raised and paid in the counties, without the intervention of the central authority. If we judge by the rate of pay to the officers and men of the Militia,

it was a much more expensive army than our present regular force. Mr. Bruce gives the statement from the county of Northampton in 1588, of the expenses of levying, clothing, and supplying with ammunition and their stores (not arms) and pay for five days' training for 600 men, which amounts to £1,172; of which the pay of the men was only £86. In 1872 3, the pay of the rank and file of the British forces amounted to about one fifth of the estimate for the whole expenses of the effective force. If we assume that the pay of the rank and file of the Militia at the time of the Armada was half of the whole expenses, we shall probably be near the truth. Taking that proportion; and assuming the whole 160,000 to have been embodied, and that the pay of heavy horsemen was 1s. 6d. a day; that of the light horsemen 1s., and of the footman 8d.; the total cost of the whole rank and file would have been nearly £250,000 per month; and the total cost of the whole preparations on land would have been £500,000 per month; and if we take the purchasing power of money in the necessaries of life, at that time, to have been six times as much as it is now, the above sum would be equivalent to £3,000,000, are about 15s. per head of population for the month. The total cost of the British Army and appliances for 1872 3, was estimated at £14,824,500, which would be less than 10s. per head of the present population, for the whole year.

It is true that during the time this Militia force was not embodied, there was hardly any charge upon the country; but considering that they were in fear of the invasion for a whole year, the whole force must have been embodied for a period of altogether three months; at all events we may assume that the country was quite prepared to pay the necessary expense for such a time. This would, therefore, have been equivalent in our day to £9,000,000; and if we take the difference in population into account, it would be equivalent to our spending £72,000,000 on a war that lasted three months, and that for the army only.

### NAVAL PREPARATIONS IN ENGLAND.

The aspect brightens when we look towards the sea. Not that the Government used more diligence on the sea, than they did on the land, but the English Navy had a field for their energies more independent of the Government. Fortunately for England, the people had never lost that attraction to the sea, which made it seem part of their country; and the maxim of Alfred "That England only enjoyed peace from invasion when her fleets were powerful enough to repel it from her shores," had never been altogether forgotten. In the reign of Elizabeth, the new field for sea enterprise in the Indies, coming at a time of comparatively long peace, had revived the national predilections, and had created a race of adventurous seamen, and made the fleets of England once more claim dominion on the "narrow seas." Thus there was a material of ships and experienced seamen ready to make use of, and in the temper to use themselves.

It is somewhat difficult to arrive at the precise numbers of vessels in the Royal Navy and of merchants employed on this occasion, because the numbers are given for different days of the whole affair, in the course of which some became disabled and others were added. By taking the names of all vessels of all kinds mentioned in the records of the time, as given by Bruce and Dodsley, it appears that the following numbers were employed at one time or other:—

	Nos.	Ton.	Guns.	Men.
Royal Navy.....	35	12,690	658	6,361
Merc't and private ships	161	20,000	400*	9,070

These were divided into two fleets; one under the Lord Admiral, Lord Charles Howard, containing two squadrons; a squadron under himself with Sir John Hawkins, as Rear Admiral of 17 Royal and 52 merchant ships (chiefly victuallers), and a squadron under Sir Francis Drake, as Vice Admiral of 6 Royal and 34 merchant ships. This fleet was stationed at Plymouth. The other fleet was under Lord Henry Seymour and consisted of 12 Royal and 52 merchant ships, of which 23 were furnished by the Cinque Ports, and the remainder by the City of London. This fleet was stationed in the Downs.

The Royal ships averaged about 300 tons, 14 guns, and 140 men; the largest, the "Triumph" (Sir Martin Forbisher) had 1,000 tons, 40 guns, and 500 men. The merchant ships, averaged about 130 tons, varying from 30 to 400 tons, of which about half were above 80 tons.

It will be seen that although the total number of vessels employed on the English side, was greater than that of the Spaniards, the tonnage was a little more than one half, and the number of men and number of guns were not more than one half of the adversaries. The English ships had the advantage of having a fewer number of persons on board each ship, and that a much greater proportion of that number were efficient seaman.

\*Estimated only.

(To be Continued.)

### Wimbledon.

(From the Toronto Globe.)

CANADIAN CAMP,  
Wimbledon Common,  
12th July, 1875.

I finished my first letter to you while awaiting the arrival of the Canadian team, on Saturday afternoon. They left Liverpool at ten o'clock in the morning, and came via Willesden Junction and Kensington through to Putney, and just as the camp clock struck seven, Col. McKinlay, Major Cotton, and Major Gibson, the "Prince of Ties," entered the Canadian camp, along with the rest of the team. The first Saturday night in camp is not always the most pleasant, especially when varied with torrents of rain and hail, and at intervals vivid forked lightning. However, the arrangements made were so complete that the team suffered little inconvenience, and the high wind which prevailed had but little effect on the fastenings of their tents. Sunday morning did not bring with it propitious weather. The storm of the night, which had apparently exhausted its efforts, came on anew, and interfered sadly with those who had outdoor work to perform. Throughout the whole camp the scene was rather a wretched one, and there were more growls than smiles on the faces of new comers to Wimbledon. Those who were old habits of the common were rather better posted, as it was not their first introduction to a rainy night and day on the tented plain. Old campaigners had carefully trenched all their tents on Saturday evening, whilst the youngsters, overjoyed at their taste of the secrets of camp life, had neglected each timely precautions, and their