

*Ambiguities  
continue  
to be source  
of difficulties*

into retaliating against an adversary's violation (or assumed violation) even if it is not in that state's interest to do so. There is something more compelling about the need to react to perceived increments of weapons controlled by a treaty than to buildups not so regulated. Such suspicion is likely to set back the cause of disarmament further, and even to accelerate the arms race. We have already encountered a number of accusations of alleged Soviet violations of the SALT I agreements, including assertions that the Soviet Union has tested a type of radar system that could be utilized in an ABM system, that it has replaced smaller ICBMs with missiles above the size-limitations agreed on, and that it has used decoys and camouflage to interfere with United States national technical means of verification. The Soviet Union in turn has accused the United States of camouflaging some of its missiles. Ambiguities of this sort, as well as those arising over the unilateral interpretations that were publicized by the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of signing the agreements, are likely to pose further difficulties in the future. The problem, of course, is what this does to the prospects of negotiating more meaningful disarmament agreements, for distrust is already very high.

#### **No permanency**

Although the temporary nature of the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons was recognized in its title, efforts to negotiate a more long-lived treaty have failed thus far, as the strategic arms race continues. Despite the fact that the Vladivostok Accord was signed in November 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be some distance from negotiating a final treaty. But even after an agreement is negotiated it would serve to delay negotiations for more meaningful reductions, since the proposed treaty is to be in effect until 1985.

Mr. Kissinger has argued that it is more feasible to negotiate the actual reduction of strategic weapons once a ceiling has been placed on the arms race. But it should be noted that an interim ceiling placed on the arms race in 1972 did not result in an agreement to reduce weapons at Vladivostok. Instead, a new and higher ceiling was established. It appears only too obvious that what has happened in recent years is merely the codification of the strategic arms race.

If a significant reduction of strategic capability is to be negotiated, several changes must be made in terms of the positions

taken by the two sides. Most important, perhaps, is a need to rethink the notion of "essential equivalence". Although the notion presumably enables one to develop a systemic "overview" of the power balance in which one can recognize some of the less-obvious power factors such as geographical proximity, potential help from other states, differing threat situations, etc., in practice "essential equivalence" has been interpreted as meaning that an equivalence in each weapon system is particularly difficult to persuade the mass public and domestic political leaders otherwise, as they look strictly at the comparative numbers. Overlooked calculations for the strategic balance include some 7,000 U.S. tactical nuclear warheads in Europe alone; additional nuclear capabilities contributed by France and the United Kingdom to the military strength of the Western alliance system; the fact that the Soviet Union has to be more concerned than the United States with the threat from Communist China; and the fact that the United States is able to keep a higher percentage of SLBMs on station owing to its bases and access to the seas.

#### **Improbable**

It is improbable that agreement will ever be reached on just how to measure essential equivalence. Suggestions for measures of "throw-weight" are used at the point, since the United States has purposely chosen to emphasize smaller warheads, believing them to be more efficient. Correspondingly, it is unlikely that the United States would agree to measuring equivalence in terms of the number of warheads on each side. Other conditions enter into the calculation because of the varying accuracy of missiles and relative vulnerability. The concept of a breakthrough in terms of permitting one side to determine the specific "mix" of strategic-force capabilities within a certain range was a useful one. But a substantial strategic-arms reduction will probably require a fundamental rethinking of just how much capability is necessary for sufficient deterrence. Substantial reduction of strategic weapons will probably require acceptance of the notion of minimal deterrence, with each side having a sufficient protected retaliatory capability in which one feels secure. Only in that way can the compulsion to react to each and every increment in power on the part of the adversary be reduced.

Whatever is done in the SALT negotiations should be directed primarily at making the nuclear-deterrent system more stable. The proper response to the