

over, France makes a significant contribution in the air defence field, maintaining 120 interceptor aircraft and 54 Hawk surface-to-air missiles. Apart from providing more national security than could be given by Canada's 36 interceptors, this contribution allows France to argue, more persuasively than Canada could, that despite separation, it is still pulling its weight in the West's defensive effort. In this case, the comparison with France reinforces the view, expressed by several witnesses, that if Canada withdrew from NORAD it would come under considerable domestic and allied pressure to augment its national air defence capability substantially.

Yet another weakness in the analogy with Europe is that the NATO joint commands exist independently of France, so that there is an existing integrated command for France to join in an emergency. This is not the case in North America. If Canada were to withdraw from NORAD, the integrated command would cease to exist. For France, a last minute decision to integrate its air defence forces with those of its allies in Europe is therefore feasible, whereas Canada could not retain the option if it withdrew from NORAD.

Finally, your Committee recognizes that the position of the United States is unique, because the strategic deterrent for the whole of the Western alliance lies mainly within its boundaries. The relation of Canada to the protection of that deterrent imposes obligations and raises problems, for Canada, the United States and the other allies, which are not found in the relationship between France and the other NATO countries.

These considerations support the view that maintenance of an integrated command can be justified in peacetime since such a command is necessary in time of emergency to make air defence arrangements effective. Given the present strategic situation and especially given the very modest forces which Canada now has for the defence of its sovereign air space, your Committee considers that the present arrangements providing for the augmentation of Canadian forces in time of emergency are necessary to give substance to NORAD'S defensive capacity. With relatively small forces on both sides of the border, their effectiveness and deterrent value is substantially augmented through their being under the control of an integrated command.

However, your Committee also believes that an integrated command, no matter how desirable on other strategic grounds, can be justified only if it is effective. In this regard, it was told at Colorado Springs that the Cheyenne Mountain Complex and the regional command and control centres, including the underground SAGE complex at North Bay, would now be vulnerable to missile attack in the event of an assault on North America. As a result, the United States has AWACS aircraft under production and is considering making them available for command and control functions in emergencies in Alaska and each of the four new NORAD regions located in the lower United States.

In an attack on North America, the command and control centre now located at North Bay and the one which may be established in Western Canada, could be expected to be primary targets. To be effective as a deterrent in an emer-

gency, these centres should possibly also have access to AWACS aircraft. If such access does not become available, for economic or other reasons, your Committee believes that the retention of an integrated command might be of reduced value. It therefore believes that the question of participation in NORAD should be re-examined in the light of the development of AWACS and of the arrangement concerning their use which may be made between Canada and the United States. This is one reason why your Committee considers that it should reassess the NORAD arrangements in three or four years time.

C. Canadian Sovereignty and Independence

In the past, NORAD's effects on Canada's sovereignty and independence have been seen somewhat ambiguously. On the one hand, participation in the agreement had enhanced Canada's ability to ensure surveillance and control of its sovereign airspace. On the other hand, the fact that much of that surveillance was provided by American forces from bases located in the United States has been seen by some as compromising Canada's independence. In its last Report concerning NORAD, on April 16, 1973, the Committee concluded that NORAD did in fact enhance Canada's sovereign control of its airspace, but emphasized its belief that

"as long as these detection and identification functions continue to be important, they should be performed by Canadian personnel at Canadian-operated bases. While there may be a need for some foreign military personnel to be stationed on Canadian territory, they should be kept as few in number as possible."

This objective may soon be met in part, for if the proposed new Eastern and Western Canadian air defence regions are established, then Canadian forces, operating under Canadian commanders from Canadian bases, would be responsible for the surveillance of Canada's entire airspace. Ironically, however, NORAD's positive enhancement of Canada's capacity to protect its sovereignty might be slightly reduced by these developments. Canada would no longer be able to rely on the United States for the performance in peacetime of certain vital functions, and unless improved or additional interceptors were acquired, Canada would not have the capability to control its entire airspace.

Your Committee recognizes that membership in NORAD, because it is a purely bilateral relationship in which the other member is overwhelmingly superior in strength and capability, will inevitably give the impression that Canada's independence is compromised. Nevertheless, your Committee has concluded, particularly if the proposed new regions are established, that withdrawal from NORAD would add very little to Canada's independence in peacetime.

A rather different set of considerations would apply in a time of war or international emergency. It can be assumed that, in the event of an apprehended Soviet air attack on North America, United States forces would in self-defence enter Canada's airspace whether or not Canada approved. As a legitimization of such entry, and more importantly as a vehicle for controlling the terms and conditions under which entry takes place, NORAD has rightly been seen as protecting, if not enhancing, Canada's sovereignty. Provi-