

8. We therefore think that the hearings should be conducted in public, if only to prevent the USSR from discrediting evidence taken in camera. It would be unfortunate if the committee were to allow a desire to obtain the widest possible measure of agreement to lead to emasculation of its report and to direct its hearing accordingly. Although we believe that by confining itself to facts the committee should be able to present a succinct report we would hope that these facts could be fully documented in annexes and that in any event if the committee found itself too strongly divided to produce an acceptable common statement, it should be prepared to present either majority and minority reports or an agreed report followed by supplementary submissions.

9. The use to which the report should be put will depend on its conclusions and the circumstances at the time of its release. We agree that further condemnatory resolutions in the meantime are likely to be futile and inadvisable, unless there is a sudden change in the picture.

10. All reports indicate that the struggle is not yet over in Hungary. The régime is held in contempt even by its employees and passive resistance continues. It would seem that both the Kadar régime and the USSR are counting on the winter and the depletion of food stocks to bring the population to heel. It would follow that we should expect no compromise before the spring. Only such a compromise will make it easy for many members of the UN to move beyond relief. It might be useful if the committee took this possibility into account as regards the timing and substance of its reports.

11. These suggestions imply, within the broader terms of reference of the committee which are inherent in the circumstances of its creation, the adoption of a few precise but connected objectives: documentary justification for the condemnation of the USSR, the exposure of the myth of the Soviet socialist solution for Eastern Europe, the holding of Hungary, which has rebelled against that solution, in the limelight, a show of moral support for the valour of the Hungarians, and the encouragement of continued resistance by a demonstration that in the eyes of the UN a compromise is not only possible but inevitable, with a hint to all concerned that a compromise will make it easier for the West to move beyond relief to consider re-habilitation for Hungary. We realize, however, that we can only attempt to influence the committee's programme through our close friends on the committee.

51.

DEA/12476-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], February 4, 1957

CANADIAN RELIEF FOR HUNGARY

In telegram 152† of January 30 our Delegation to NATO reports on a further Council Session at which the problem of Western aid to Hungary was considered. You may recall in earlier telegrams (CANAC telegram 123† and Paris telegram 86† of January 25) it was reported that the French were pressing proposals which would provide for some measure of rehabilitation as well as relief for Hungary. Copies of these telegrams are attached for your reference. Since it appears probable that this question will be under continued consid-