

that the message took hold, new objectives, evaluative standards, and procedures could create in Russian industry a greater sense of affinity, if not community, with best practice elsewhere. Voluntary peer reviews of nuclear safety, for example, could become something of a standard Russian procedure in demonstrating reliability, competitiveness, and identification with global norms of excellence. Of course, one multinational programme and once management Corporation cannot be expected to transform the Russian identity, sense of quality, and understanding of worth in civil nuclear affairs. But to the degree that enculturation in something like quality assurance was successful, the work of disposition would surely go better, Russia's nuclear industry would become less accident-prone, the programme as a whole would more easily be sustained, and Russia would gain higher standing in the nuclear-safety club.

To provide further agency for donor countries on behalf of disposition, the Corporation's terms of reference could also require it to work closely with and to support GAN. An exemplary attitude on the MMC's part over a decade or more should go some way in promoting accountability and respect for an independent regulator within the industry and the country more widely. But there needs to be more of a GAN for the Corporation to work with in the first place. Donors could therefore consider making the Multilateral Agreement conditional on legislation to strengthen GAN's licensing authority, and on a Federation commitment both to increase the agency's base budget and to endow it with political backing for enforcement as well as standard-setting powers on a par with what's found in other G-8 countries. Similarly, donors wanting greater assurance of sustained disposition could well seek an undertaking from the Russian Federation to establish a Ministry, and not a State Committee, for environmental protection.

In addition to continuing efforts on behalf of better regulation, donors and the Corporation as their executive agent would face immediate and precedent-setting tasks which should be provided for in the Multilateral Agreement and related accords. Specifically, are nuclear-safety and environmental-impact assessments to be done for the disposition programme as a whole? Are they to be performed before the first concrete is poured? By whom? With what expenditure of time and money? And whose money? If the goal is simultaneously to protect Russia from adversity connected with disposition and to secure disposition against nuclear accident and political attack, licensing and impact-assessment work will have to be up to the highest standard. If they're not, avoidable difficulty would be sure to follow. But GAN alone isn't fully up to the task. Still less is the environmental-protection office of the resources ministry. Nor would the MMC itself be well suited to the task in view of its mandate to make a success of a given reactor-based disposition programme which others disputed, for example on the safety of the VVER-1000 or BN-800 (Kuznetsov and Slivyak, 2001; Kuznetsov et al., 2001). Evidently it would fall to the Corporation to establish independent international nuclear-safety and environmental-impact assessment panels in conjunction with the relevant Russian regulatory agencies. All of this would have to be sorted out by the negotiators of the Multilateral Agreement in a way that showed respect for civil society as well as government, industry, and the regulator in Russia.

Finally, there's action the Corporation could take to underwrite the capacity of civil society in Russia to voice the public interest in safety and environmental matters. The action in this case ought to be practical and exemplary. It could break the mold for international security institutions.