

The Soviet Union has stated that in its opinion the corresponding article in the United States draft is inadequate, as it would seem to allow dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations within the NATO alliance. Neither existing NATO arrangements nor others which have been discussed constitute dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations within the alliance.

It seems obvious that the reconciliation of the two divergent views of what Article I should contain, and what the following article on the specific undertakings of non-nuclear nations should be, will require extended negotiations among all the nations affected. The problem is to draft and agree on a treaty which, while it will prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and more specifically will prevent the emergence of more independent nuclear powers, will not inhibit the free political evolution of Europe and will preserve the right of all nations to enter into such political arrangements as they wish, including collective defence arrangements, provided always that such arrangements would not constitute nuclear proliferation.

The Canadian Delegation finds the U.S.S.R. draft defective also in the following respects. It contains no provisions for verifying that the parties are fulfilling their obligations. The United States draft treaty, on the other hand, contains the provision that the parties will co-operate in facilitating acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The Canadian Delegation feels that this is a provision which any nation that has no intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons should be willing to accept.

Article VI of the Soviet Union draft, concerning withdrawal from the obligations of the treaty, is modelled on the corresponding article of the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the three environments, signed in Moscow. This article, the Canadian Delegation believes, is too permissive. Any state could renounce its obligations "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country". Thus, any party to the treaty could denounce it on what might be unfounded rumours or mere morbid suspicions, and would not have to justify its action in any international forum. The corresponding article in the United States draft -- that is, Article VI, Paragraph 1 -- obliges the party contemplating withdrawal to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council, which could be expected to investigate thoroughly a situation which could have grave consequences for international peace and security.

Article VI, Paragraph 2, in the United States draft treaty is intended to provide non-nuclear nations with the opportunity to review the operation of the treaty after a stated period of years. In addition to giving signatories a chance to review the provisions of the treaty in the light of actual experience, this portion of the United States draft treaty will also give the non-nuclear nations an opportunity to assess whether the nuclear powers have, in fact, achieved, "effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals", as they were declared in the fifth paragraph of the preamble of the United States draft (ENDC/152). If there were no such progress, the non-nuclear nations could decide whether they wished to be bound any longer by the essentially one-sided obligations of the treaty.