

This sort of data has led some to conclude that military expenditures cannot be addressed in a consistent or systematic fashion by focusing on multilateral financial instruments. The thrust of this report, however, leads in the contrary direction. Although the mainly oil-rich states of the Middle East are unlikely to be affected by systematically subjecting lending and aid policies to military spending criteria, what is most striking is how few exceptions there actually are beyond these resource-rich states. Just over half of the major military spenders remain vulnerable to some multilateral pressures.

More importantly, the policy goal identified in this report is not necessarily to use the levers of IDA or debt relief as the means to obtain reductions in military spending, but simply as a means by which to catalyze a regional or multilateral dialogue on the appropriate level of military expenditures in various states and regions. Greater transparency in spending and in decision-making is the goal, and the levers of IDA or debt relief can represent appropriate rationales for dialogue. Finally, since one central thesis of this report has been that a regional focus is more appropriate as a means to draw comparisons, attention can be paid to a much wider range of states with possibly excessive military burdens, (defined in regional terms, and along various measures). In sum, the number of states that could usefully be drawn into a dialogue on constraining or reducing military spending is much larger than Table 7 by itself suggests.

The remaining task of this report is to reinforce this conclusion by highlighting the status of those states that were signalled in the various case studies as being *prima facie* states of concern within their regions, in order to see whether or not they are heavily indebted or dependent upon development assistance. Sixty-two states were evaluated in total, and they are listed in Table 8 at the end of this chapter. A total of roughly nineteen states were identified as possibly carrying an excessive military burden, on one or more of the axes measured, in the different regions and sub-regions examined. The most significant or consistent outliers were Nicaragua, El Salvador, Bolivia, Colombia, Mauritania, Libya, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Zaire, Laos and Myanmar, while several other states warranted some closer examination (Chile, Uruguay, Botswana, Cambodia and Vietnam). These states have been italicized in Table 8 below. Obviously, many of them suffer from a range of internal and external threats to security that explain the high level of resources they devote to the military, but this merely implies that strategies to tackle military expenditures must also take into account broader security-building considerations. One should also note that only eight of these twenty states appear in Table 7 above.

Yet if one looks more closely at this group of twenty states, it confirms the general argument that once a qualitative and regionally-sensitive analysis is conducted, it turns out that the states that are identified are (with a few exceptions), relatively vulnerable to international pressure and attention. Fourteen of the twenty states score as "dependent," when this is defined as having *either* more than four percent of GNP from development assistance or external debt of more than 50 percent of GNP. Not surprisingly, states such as Libya or Chile are not captured in this measure (the other exceptions are Botswana, Colombia, and Myanmar), but enough of the states of potential concern are captured to reinforce the policy-relevance