

necessary for determining compliance. The transparency and information resulting from CBMs and data available from NIM should be fully explored in the second step. Data resulting from CBMs could result in less intrusive and less expensive verification regimes while maintaining the required level of confidence in compliance. Such data can be utilized to challenge ambiguous situations without compromising sensitive sources and methods associated with some NIM.

In future multilateral and regional arms control agreements, an important part of the task of assuring compliance will involve designing and implementing a negotiated verification regime in a manner that will confirm compliance, resolve ambiguous situations, deter possible violations and detect non-compliance in sufficient time to take appropriate action. Although many current verification regimes are focused on assuring full compliance, it may become desirable in future regimes to include specific provisions on possible actions to be taken in the event of non-compliance; including such provisions could further deter cheating, provide a basis for action by other parties, and partially answer the to-date-unanswered question, "after non-compliance, what?"

