



West arms control and disarmament. Since no short standard definition of CBMs exists, we will reproduce here a functional description of CBMs elaborated by a Canadian researcher in order to capture their essence:

1. CBMs are a variety of arms control measure entailing
2. deliberate state actions
3. that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral
4. that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
5. by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
6. often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
7. and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
8. and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

While the mandate of the Stockholm Conference stipulates that the CSBMs are to be militarily significant, politically binding, adequately verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, the exact nature of these measures is left up to the Conference to determine. Since its January 1984 opening, which occurred at the foreign minister level as urged by Canada, the Stockholm Conference has been engaged in the complicated process of trying to arrive at a mutually agreed understanding of what form these CSBMs should take. This negotiating process is intended to reconcile the divergent views of participants as to the appropriate nature of the CSBMs the Conference is to adopt, and in particular

those approaches to confidence-building held by the West and the East.

The Western approach to confidence-building emphasizes the need for better mutual understanding of the normal military activity of participating States through imparting a greater degree of openness and regularity to this activity, with a view to reducing the risk of military conflict caused by surprise, misperception and mistrust. The East, on the other hand, has favoured the adoption of broad political undertakings which in its view create a necessary climate or background of confidence which can then facilitate the acceptance of more practical "military/technical" measures — as the East describes the "concrete measures" approach to confidence-building. To put it another way, the West favours a gradual building up of confidence through a series of concrete steps, whereas the East prefers an initial declaration that confidence exists and its subsequent reinforcement with subordinate and limited specific measures. The Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) States, while generally in harmony with the Western approach, tend to pursue individual national security interests.

After its formal opening on January 17, 1984, the Conference devoted its first year of discussions to a general debate in plenary outlining the different approaches to confidence-building espoused by the various participants. Proposals reflecting these approaches were tabled by the major groupings of States during the course of the year. The NATO countries were first to table a comprehensive proposal in January, followed by the NNA in March and the Warsaw Pact (WPO) States in May.

After considerable preliminary negotiations the Conference finally agreed in December 1984 to establish two subsidiary working groups: working group 'B' dealing with measures of observation and notification (i.e., those CBMs already present in the Final Act) and working group 'A' examining all other proposed measures (i.e., CBMs which are not now included in the Final Act). This working structure facilitated a more detailed examination of the original

proposals during the course of 1985 and was further refined in October on the basis of an informal agreement. This agreement (in typically qualified CSCE language) specified "those topics which might figure in the subsequent process of drafting language on a set of mutually complementary CSBMs, in accordance with the mandate, for possible inclusion in a concluding document." As a result, working group 'A' meets three times a week to discuss: 1) non-use of force; 2) information exchange, compliance and verification, and development of means of communications and consultations, in the context of a notification system comprising a set of mutually complementary CSBMs; and 3) constraining measures and annual forecasts of military activity; while working group 'B' continues to meet twice a week to discuss observation and notification of military activity.

Although it might appear merely a procedural arrangement, the October agreement was highly significant, as it fixed, for the first time, the type of measures that should figure in any eventual final agreement. By means of the October arrangement, the Soviet Union agreed to set aside all of its initial political-declaratory measures (such as an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons or the establishment of a chemical weapons free zone with the exception of an agreement on the non-use of force (NUF)), while the West agreed in return to negotiate some reaffirmation of the NUF principle. It is by such subtle and informal (the October agreement is not officially recorded in the Conference's documents) understandings that the Stockholm Conference moves forward to its elusive goal — a significant agreement on European military security affairs that at the same time is agreeable to all 35 participating States.

Another noteworthy development in the Conference's deliberations was the December 1985 agreement on a complete work programme for 1986 which sets September 19, 1986, as an adjournment date. This act of the Conference sets a time limit of sorts for completing the negotiations prior to the convening of the next CSCE Follow-up Conference in Vienna in November 1986 which is to