

boundary . . . There is no mention of any Chinese reservation in respect of the India-Tibet frontier either during the discussions or at the time of their initialling the Convention.

It is interesting to note in passing that, although Chinese and Russian maps at present in circulation show the border in the east as claimed, a Chinese spokesman at the time of the Dalai Lama's escape must have failed to read the correct map. He announced that the Tibetan leader had entered India at the post just north of Tawang, that is, the McMahon Line.

In the west (Ladakh), the Chinese are pressing claims that take in some 6,000 square miles of high, thinly-populated but fertile valleys believed to contain considerable mineral wealth. They have disavowed a treaty of 1842 between Tibet and Kashmir, claiming that no Chinese representative was present. Their maps show a boundary which they say followed more or less that shown in a map of "Punjab, Western Himalaya and adjoining parts of Tibet" published in 1854. The Indians, on their side, have said that custom, usage, surveys and numerous maps have established their claim. In answering the Chinese assertions Mr. Nehru wrote on September 26, 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai:

It is true that the 1842 treaty referred merely to the 'old established frontiers'. This was because these frontiers were well-known and did not require any formal delimitation . . . References in the Ladakhi Chronicles of the seventeenth century indicate that the boundary was well-established . . . it is clear that for nearly two centuries the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was well-known and recognized by both sides. There was a constant flow of trade between Ladakh and Tibet during these centuries (17th to 19th) . . . and no boundary conflicts ever arose.

Mr. Nehru went on to list seven survey parties between 1868 and 1900 that had determined the location of the customary frontier on the basis of natural features in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh claimed by the Chinese.

There have been disputes over the ownership of other small sections of the border between the NEFA and Ladakh. These differences, as in Bara Hoti, for example, have not assumed the magnitude of those in the two main areas. Chinese maps show some 40,000 square miles, all told, of territory, generally considered by Indians as part of the subcontinent, lying within the People's Republic.

In most cases it would appear that access to the disputed territory is easier physically from Tibet. The Chinese have used this to advantage and have entrenched themselves firmly in eastern Ladakh. They have as well remained in possession of the Longju outpost in the NEFA which they seized last August. They have been aided in these penetrations, particularly in the west, by a communication system superior to that of the Indians. The road through Aksai Chin (the bulge of Ladakh) has contributed to their success as well. This route, part of the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway, was the subject of a note from the Government of India in October 1958, in which, after a general explanation that the terrain was historically part of India, the Government expressed surprise and regret that it had neither been asked for permission to build nor informed of the proposed construction. This mild approach illustrates what was, until recently, the general attitude of the Indian Government to the border areas. Indian effectiveness on the spot was likewise in direct contrast to that of the Chinese. Small and widely scattered outposts have been garrisoned, often during the summer months only, by civil border police. Roads to link the region more closely to