were still to be settled. The question with respect to the composition—that is, the nationality—of personnel in control stations, and the composition of personnel in mobile units had to be decided, and above all the methods of procedure which would be provided in the treaty for the organization—the control commission, or whatever it might be called—whereby they would conduct their business.

Sir, without going into any of the details, I am bound to report that the old question of veto arose again in those discussions. The U.S.S.R. wanted, and want at the moment, to have a veto with respect to certain inspections that might be proposed in that country. Mr. Khrushchev in his recent statement of February 24 said they were not going to have spies and intelligence officers from the West discovering what is their military strength and potential. Well, Mr. Speaker, I am bound to observe this, that any machinery set up under a treaty for the cessation of nuclear tests which does not provide for inspection and control would be misleading and deceptive, and dangerous to the West.

Then I must observe, despite some foreshadowing of an adjournment of those talks which is to be found in the press only this morning, that we do hope and pray that the question of machinery for detection, and so forth, may be satisfactorily settled. As I said a moment ago, and I repeat, mankind everywhere, I am sure, must pray for at least one step to be taken toward cessation of nuclear testing; and from that step let us pray that it will be continued into other parts of the galaxy of nuclear arms.

Surprise Attack

With respect to surprise attack the story is less comforting, indeed. Last summer Canada contributed to the panel from the West at a meeting in Geneva for the study by experts, as in the other case for the cessation of nuclear tests, of methods whereby surprise attacks might be identified or anticipated. This concerned a larger group: Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States on the Western side; from the Soviet Bloc the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Roumania and Albania. They began their deliberations on November 10 of last year, and just before Christmas they adjourned—it might appear sine die but this was not so stated.

There was a conflict. The proposal really came out of an exchange of notes last winter with respect to the holding of a summit conference. In one of those notes Mr. Eisenhower, the President of the United States, proposed there should be such a conference with respect to surprise attacks; and to us it seemed abundantly clear that what the President of the United States of America was suggesting was the holding of a conference of experts. But when those representatives from the five countries of the West met with the Soviet side, they realized that what had appeared to us to be consent on the part of the U.S.S.R. to a discussion at the expert level turned out to be an intention to discuss political matters, such as bases and so on, and the minds of the two sides did not meet. We are now in consultation with other representatives of the West who participated in the conference of last November and December so that we might review the scope of the agenda and the possibility of a resumption of the conference.