

theory is built upon, and contains nothing foreign to, concrete facts.

But the simplest way of showing that all the functions of the illative sense are performed by this maligned logic, is to take the Cardinal's own example of its exercise. Speaking of the various contradictions that exist amongst the different historians of the pre-historic period of Greece and Rome, "We see," he remarks, "how a controversy . . . is carried on from starting points, and with collateral aids, not formally proved, but more or less assumed, the process of assumption lying in the action of the Illative sense, applied to primary elements of thought respectively congenial to the disputants." And he adds, "Should it be objected, apropos of this particular case, that the instinctive reasoning on which I have been dwelling, is not worth much, since it has not brought the disputants into agreement, I answer that I profess to be stating facts, not devising an optimism." "Moreover," he says, "it must be recollected, that the controversy is still in its beginnings; and there is no reason for deciding that it will not lead in the event to a unanimous conclusion of some kind, that is, either to an assent to one particular view of the history as the true one, or else to a conviction that no true view is attainable."⁽²⁵⁾ That is to say, a juster estimate, and one on which more reliance may be placed, of this portion of history will accrue, if all the disputants but one merge their illative senses in deference to the illative sense of that one; or, better still, when, without exception, they eliminate their

25. *Op. cit.* Ch. ix. § 3.