

sion expressed in unilateral form by a number of countries to accept certain safeguards principles in all cases of nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states, whether party to the NPT or not. More countries are likely, on the basis of review, to make such a decision.

The Canadian government has pressed, in its discussions, for the highest possible level of safeguards to be applied to all nuclear transfer. We are satisfied that much progress has been made as a result of this effort and that further progress can be made. It is one further stage in the evolution of the international safeguards system. The London club conclusions, as the suppliers' meetings have been called, have been a success and, I believe, in line with the reasoning put forward by the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands. We have covered one of the difficulties that is encountered by a single country acting alone.

● (1630)

May I say a word about India, because it has been a matter of—

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** Order, please. I regret that I have to interrupt the hon. minister, but the time allotted to him has expired.

**Some hon. Members:** Carry on.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** Is there unanimous consent to allow the minister to continue.

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Stanfield:** Come clean in your extra period of grace.

**Mr. MacEachen:** I have been invited to come clean in my explanation, and indeed I will be quite prepared to oblige because the situation with regard to India, or the question posed by our negotiations with India at the present time is a clear and easily understood question. The basic attitude I have taken in these negotiations is, in effect, what policy to be pursued by the government of Canada is in the best interests of non-proliferation in respect of India? I was going to make a political comment, but I had better not do so as my time is short. I will keep to the substance of the subject by saying that following the explosion in May, 1974, discussions have been held with the Indian government to ensure that existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor be strengthened, that the withdrawal of Canada from nuclear co-operation with India should not produce a collapse of the safeguards, and that India should carry out a responsible policy as a potential exporter of nuclear technology, material and equipment.

**Mr. Brisco:** Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I regret very much to interrupt and intrude upon the time of the minister. I only wish to point out that there seems to be an open microphone in the booth over there, and I am getting a personal conversation rather than the scintillating words of the minister.

**Some hon. Members:** Oh, oh!

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** I am sure that our technicians will look into the matter immediately.

### *Nuclear Proliferation*

**An hon. Member:** Is it a good conversation?

**Mr. Brisco:** I am still getting this personal conversation and it is getting more delightful by the minute.

**An hon. Member:** What channel are you on?

**Mr. MacEachen:** Following the explosion that occurred in India in May, 1974, Canada suspended its nuclear co-operation with India. It did so because in our view the carrying out of that explosion was in clear violation of the understanding that had been reached between Canada and India. In my view, no amount of argumentation can conceal the fact that the Indian government knew perfectly well that any kind of explosion would be contrary to the understanding that had been reached between Canada and India. That is clear to me.

The other argument has been put by India to the effect that you can have an explosion for peaceful purposes. We claim that the technology required for a so-called peaceful explosion is the same technology that leads to nuclear weaponry. No valid distinction can be drawn between an explosion for peaceful purposes and an explosion for weapons' purposes. That is our position, and it has continued to be our position up to the present time, although studies apparently have been launched, or are proposed to be launched under the auspices of the NPT respecting the suggestion that you can have an explosion for peaceful purposes.

We suspended our nuclear co-operation with India. The power reactor is not completed, but the shipment of materials has been suspended. Under the agreement with India that we entered into, we have an obligation to complete the shipment to the reactor, both of material and fuel. That is the obligation that is now in suspense. It is suggested, I believe, by the hon. member very clearly that at this stage Canada should put into a permanent state its suspension of co-operation with India. That is a possible line of policy. But I ask the hon. member, has he considered the risk that might result if India then allowed the safeguard system at that reactor to disappear entirely?

They have, at the present time, on that reactor a safeguard system and part of our objective, if we continue our relationship with India, would be to upgrade the existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor. That is a question hon. members have to consider, and it is a question that I am presently considering. We have no intention of staying permanently in India. The purpose of our negotiations is to get out, and get out we will. The question is, do we get out now, or do we get out when we complete our current obligations; and in completing our current obligations, are we doing more for the non-proliferation system; and if we do get out now, do we leave that RAPP reactor unsafeguarded? Basically, this is one of the main questions that is now under consideration.

The hon. member has asked me to come clean with the House. I should like to put before the House some of the questions I am presently considering before making a final recommendation to my colleagues as to whether we ought to complete this particular aspect of our co-operation with India prior to terminating it altogether, because that is the total objective of our policy in the long-run.