

*External Affairs*

Nations was not related to any more specific obligation than the general obligation to which I have referred, uncertainties as to the course to be followed and the differences of opinion about policies and the extent of participation were only to be expected. They are perhaps only natural and they will be resolved only by a constant and active and clear-thinking review of the situation in Korea in the light of changing events.

The situation in Europe, however, is entirely different. The twelve nations which signed the North Atlantic pact have joined in a positive declaration that they will take appropriate military action to prevent further Russian aggression in Europe and will combine their military and economic strength in every way possible for that purpose. There is no uncertainty, or there should be no uncertainty in the Kremlin as to what the commitment is. It is to be hoped that there is no uncertainty in the minds of the Russian people as to the decisions which have been reached and which have been accepted, and readily accepted, by the free peoples of the western world.

Because those decisions are for the purpose of preventing war and not for the purpose of dealing with a war already under way, as in the case of Korea, full publicity in regard to the nature of the agreements, the extent of the commitments and the manner in which all the member nations of the Atlantic community are carrying out their obligations is in itself part and parcel of the commitment to preserve peace and prevent a third world war. There may be reasons for secrecy in regard to our activities in Korea, but these should not lead us into thinking that the same reasons impose upon us the same considerations of secrecy in trying to preserve peace and prevent war in Europe.

One of the things which perhaps will prevent war is the extent to which the Kremlin, as well as our own people, is informed as to just how far we are going, how far we are prepared to go and the way in which we are carrying out our obligations so that they may realize the full strength that they will encounter if they should challenge the free nations of the western world. For that reason any secrecy or fast verbal footwork which may seem justified by an actual state of war cannot be justified in discussing or dealing with the decisions and action which are designed to prevent war by the extent to which we communicate fully to our only possible enemy exactly what may be expected if there is an act of aggression in Europe.

The decision to join in this full-fledged military alliance was made long before there was any sign of war in Korea. If war in

Korea ended tomorrow we would still have great obligations to carry out for the preservation of peace in Europe and throughout the rest of the world. As long ago as October 1949 the first meetings were held in Washington to discuss an agreement of this nature. Then in December of that year the Atlantic nations met in Paris and agreed on a basic strategic concept. In March of last year at The Hague, still some time before the Korean war started, a general agreement was reached in regard to the allocation of tasks in dealing with the threat of Russian attack. There has been little secrecy, and there should be little secrecy as to what took place at those meetings because this is an association of free peoples freely asserting their partnership in this great cause.

That is the great distinction between our task in Europe and our task in Korea. The commitment of the member nations of the North Atlantic pact is one which relates to any Russian act of aggression in Europe at any point. No doubt has been left on that score. The commitment in Korea refers specifically to Korea and one of the major problems of dealing with the situation there is the fact that no matter how far the same nations might be prepared to go to deal with any act of aggression against any nation in the Pacific ocean or bordering on it, there seems little possibility of any general pact affecting Asia at this time which would create a general commitment in that area such as has been accepted in Europe.

For that reason the uncertainties which exist in regard to Korea and Asia generally should not lead us to the conclusion that similar uncertainties are in any way a natural counterpart in considering the steps to be taken to preserve peace in Europe. In Korea the forces of the United Nations are waging war. Let us never forget that grim reality. It is war in all its ghastliness. In Europe, on the contrary, the forces brought together under General Eisenhower are waging peace. We should never forget that hopeful reality. We should always impress upon the minds of our own people and upon the minds of our great potential enemies that we are waging peace in Europe and that peace is the one purpose of the strength that we are jointly trying to build.

No man can say for how many generations humanity still must live in an atmosphere of war, waste and insecurity before the dawn of that great peace to which all our efforts should now be directed. But certain it is that in the long search for some practical plan to bring to an end the aimless destruction of war, the North Atlantic pact is one of the greatest milestones in the long history of mankind. I for one am certainly most