

the attempt to force the single service concept down the throats of unwilling recipients and to restore the lost confidence of officers and men by standing up for individual service identity" unquote.

Later I was to speak to a number of officers who hadn't been present at the meetings and the total ultimately reached 367 with no other officer not accepting the five points. I had ascertained there was absolutely no support for full unification amongst naval officers in my Command, and now it was therefore my responsibility firmly and consistently to represent their point of view.

In December 1965 came the article on the Royal Canadian Marines. This caused more bitterness and resentment than anything that had happened previously. Not only was the concept of the Royal Canadian Marines considered to be silly but the officers and men didn't like getting information from magazines which had no official status. It was generally known that a member of the Minister's personal staff had generated the article. Personally I considered it to be a trial balloon, that it was ill-considered, untimely and that it had seriously damaged morale.

On the 29th December I reported my views on ill-considered semi-official press releases to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The letter ended with this paragraph—I quote—"I expect you have heard my views often enough to find them boring. If this is the case, and if my protestations have become meaningless, and if the ill-considered press releases continue, there won't be a chance for effective leadership here to be exercised by anyone. In any event, as you can appreciate from the tone of this letter, my task of providing effective command is becoming increasingly difficult and may prove to be impossible"—unquote.

In spite of my strong statements on morale I was not visited in my Command by the Minister, the Associate Minister or Chief of the Defence Staff. In fact, I was not visited by any of them during my twenty months in command. Presumably I was supposed to look on bad morale as an acceptable condition and to ignore the causes of it.

In January of this year I was informed that there had been a few informal meetings between the Defence Staff and the Minister when unification was discussed. As I hadn't seen an appreciation on unification I thought I should send my own to Ottawa in order to show the place of the Navy in unification. I wrote my own appreciation and discussed all appropriate factors—interchangeability of personnel between services under unification, environmental conditions of sea service influencing unification, identity, esprit-de-corps, links with the past, tradition and so on. This appreciation has since been published. I forwarded the appreciation to the Chief of Personnel and advised the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff it had been forwarded and that I hoped he would read it.

The appreciation ended with this recommendation—I quote—"I recommend, that since we have freedom to define unification, this definition should confine itself to unification at the top. The definition should encompass the concept of the single Chief—a single Defence Staff—a single programme—and single administrative procedures. To go beyond this will split the Navy down the middle and cause an exodus of our best people. The consequences of this are obvious."

I believe that the sequence of events can leave little doubt in anyone's mind that the channels of communication open to me were used and used properly. I