

the attacks made across their borders by neighbouring Communist states and had shown that with financial assistance and arms from the United States and other Western countries they were prepared to resist similar attacks in future, those attacks gradually died away. Also, when the Soviet Union ultimately accepted the fact that they could not starve out Berlin without risking a general war, they abandoned the attempt and a settlement over Berlin became possible. Last spring it was thought that the Soviet Union and its friends and allies were still not prepared to run the risk of World War III. If that were true, United Nations action against the North Korean aggressors might be expected to lead to a settlement in Korea, and have a salutary effect throughout the Far East. These calculations, as we now know, were not well founded. But they were widely shared and seemed realistic on the basis of the information available to us at that time. It was only when it became plain towards the end of last year that the Soviet Union and the People's Government of China were prepared to run the risk of a general war over Korea that the dilemma of how far the United Nations could and should go in enforcing by military action collective security in a two-power world became most acute. We are still faced squarely with that dilemma.

Before considering it, however, especially as it was revealed in extreme form last November, I should like to say something of a structural development which had occurred in the United Nations in the intervening months. Having decided that the United Nations should not necessarily feel prevented from taking action against aggression in which the Soviet Union was interested and having only, by the accidental absence of the U.S.S.R., been able to organize collective resistance in Korea through the Security Council, the United States and other governments were anxious that decisions should be taken by the United Nations which would enable the Organization to act in the future with similar vigour if the Soviet were present and vetoing. There was even a temptation to suggest a drastic reconstruction of the United Nations which might have precipitated the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and its satellites and which would have converted the Organization formally and finally into an anti-Cominform coalition. This temptation, fortunately, did not prevail. In my opinion, there are at least two reasons why such a course would be highly mistaken at the present time. The first and most important reason is that it would eliminate any possibility of the United Nations still being used as a means of composing the major differences between the free world and the Soviet Union. You will remember that the dispute over Berlin was concluded very shortly after Mr. Malik, the Soviet Representative at the United Nations, entered into conversations with Dr. Jessup of the United States Delegation. This precedent alone would be enough to warrant the hope that, if the Soviet Union were convinced that because of the increasing strength of the free world, it could not achieve its objectives by force, it might seek through the United Nations at least a temporary accommodation with the countries of the West. Anything which might jeopardize that possibility, slim though it may be, would be, in my opinion, an error. Another disadvantage of a reconstruction of the United Nations involving the withdrawal of the Soviet Union would be that it might also lead at the same time to the withdrawal of some of the free countries which for various reasons do not now feel in a position to align themselves irrevocably either with the Soviet Union or the anti-Cominform coalition. The disadvantages of reducing the contacts between these countries, many of