

7 REPORT CONCLUSION

Most of the underlying issues being addressed in this study are not new, and many remain quite intransigent. However, the Rwandan crisis is an excellent vehicle to revisit these issues. Rwanda was catastrophic and should have merited rapid substantive intervention by the international community. Paradoxically, despite the massive numbers of dead and suffering, it is also a rather compact issue with a limited number of domestic and international actors. And finally, while Rwanda has gone through cycles of violence and crises, this most recent crisis occurred over a very short time frame. For these reasons, the April 1994 Rwandan crisis allows us to more clearly analyze the failures and successes of international crisis response.

Substantial and sufficient Rwandan early warning intelligence existed for years, and peaked during 1993 and early 1994. Nevertheless, many states and UN leaders did not see the need for themselves or the UN to get too involved. They hoped the issue would simply resolve itself. This hope died on April 6th, and soon after the UN and the world community should have been prepared to react with speed and forceful action. A small rapid peacekeeping deployment within the two weeks following April 6th was eminently possible, and would have substantially reduced both massacres and refugee flows.

Instead, there was a rapid withdrawal of most of UNAMIR once foreign nationals were evacuated. This was followed months later by the glacial and half hearted reinforcement of UNAMIR. At best UNAMIR did little for Rwandans during this period, and at worse, increased the hardline Hutu élites' perception of world indifference to them orchestrating massacres and refugee flows.

A fundamental lack of political will to intervene was evidenced by almost every UN member. There was a distinct lack of trust by states in the UN system, and the Security Council in particular did not allow the UN to function as it could have. The problem this time was not the UN structure or staff, but its member states

This rather abject **political** failure around Rwanda is certainly open to general censure but is less amenable to the identification of country specific culprits. The very nature of international politics is the uneven injection of a myriad of agendas and objectives into imperfect forums where manipulation and obfuscation is the order of the day. The primacy of realpolitik is not about to change quickly.

The key lesson from the Rwandan crisis is that as much as possible of the international crisis