

countries on agricultural trade reform (the G-20) and the US and EU trying to counter this with the five interested parties (EU, US, Brazil, India, Australia and sometimes Kenya).

- And the context has changed sharply: the real news to some is not the emergent commercial power of dynamic developing countries but rather poverty, the issue highlighted by the emergence of the G-90 and its constituent groups, especially the ACP, as more active players.

The second view draws on parallels to past GATT/WTO Ministerials (Brussels, Seattle, etc.) that failed; on this basis outcomes such as at Cancún can be seen as simply part of a normal part of the learning process of what it takes to put a round together. In support of this view, it was questioned how much of a power shift there has been: while China's accession has admittedly changed things, Brazil and India have been significant players in the trading system for quite a while. In any event, there was evidence of a power shift in previous rounds: the EU-US deal on "everything but agriculture" failed at the mid-term review of progress in the Uruguay Round at the GATT Ministerial in Montreal in 1988 when Rubens Ricuperio balked because he couldn't sell it to the Cairns Group (which presaged the Cairns Group rejection of the Blair House Accord of November 1992). Thus, this view asserts, it is not clear how much things are different now versus in the Uruguay Round.

In terms of the recent trend, the WTO is now reeling from, as one observer put it, three consecutive Ministerial "messes": Doha, it was argued, was as much a mess as Seattle and Cancún, just papered over as Members were driven by the need to demonstrate solidarity in the aftermath of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Yet it is also possible to see the story as perhaps less one of repeat failure than of evolution: at Seattle, developing countries gave a flat "no" to the deal, at Doha, it was a conditional "no", at Cancún there was a willingness to negotiate but not yet a "yes" to the offered deal.

From the point of view of the framers of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), its construction reflected the bias in the existing system that had not given enough emphasis to the trade issues of greatest interest to developing countries. They set out to