policies and interactions. When the process is successful, these changes can become institutionalized, altering the basic nature of security relations in important ways. "Minimalist" (traditional) accounts of confidence building fail to capture this key capacity to mediate and structure the potential for change when existing security relations are felt to be unsatisfactory.

ENDNOTES

1.   Several items stand out. First is the need to analyze with even greater care the empirical CSCE confidence building negotiation experience and the broader changes in CSCE-related security relations during the last ten or so years in order to better understand how the use of the confidence building approach interacted with these changes. This rich empirical record needs to be re-examined from a perspective informed by the transformation view. Also important is the need to explore further the various ways in which fundamental ideas about security relationships can change as a result of (among other things) engaging in a confidence building process. In particular, the psychological character of the confidence building process identified twelve years ago in *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* (but not examined since) needs to be reintegrated into the transformation view more explicitly. The role of experts groups (epistemic communities) in helping to initiate the confidence building process also needs to be examined more thoroughly, especially as efforts are undertaken to develop the confidence building approach in new application contexts. Finally, the status of confidence building as a specific form of international regime development or institution building is also a subject that needs to be examined with some care. This is a particularly rich source of theoretical insight and may serve to finally integrate the study of confidence building into contemporary international relations scholarship. The provisional treatment of this subject later in this chapter merely hints at the potential residing in this material.

2.   The author is extremely conscious that the transformation view may be open to the criticism of exaggerated inference from a singular and perhaps totally idiosyncratic example: the case of the CSCE. It certainly is true that relying on inferences about the nature of transformation, the role of an epistemic community, security management fatigue, and the other supporting conditions discussed in this chapter appears to collide with a basic complaint about confidence building thinking: that we base too much of our thinking about confidence building on the experience of the European CSCE case.

Leaving aside methodological issues associated with inductive inference, the response to this criticism is to argue that the basic concern ought to be with the *unreflective* use of the CSCE case, particularly cribbing its CBMs. This study involves, it is to be hoped, a more self-conscious exploration of the CSCE's lessons, conducted with a very specific intent to identify generalizable insights. This potential over-dependence also must be offset against the fact that the CSCE case presently is the *only* good example that we have of a genuine confidence building process. Thus, we cannot understand confidence building unless we focus on the CSCE/OSCE experience.

3.   A fourth condition — "the emergence of increasingly ambiguous, expert estimates of the military capabilities and intentions of unfriendly states in the potential application area" — present in earlier discussions of supporting conditions has been dropped. This is more appropriately viewed as an indicator of the first three conditions and would very likely function well in that role.

4.   This list of supporting conditions has undergone a good deal of revision. The treatment was initially restricted to a single list of conditions (most notably in "A Confidence-Building Framework for the Korean Peninsula," in *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* (Vol. VII, No. 1 Summer 1995)). Then, the list was split into two, in order to distinguish between "initiating" conditions and "transformative" conditions. It seems, however, that this is a false distinction that unnecessarily complicates a rather speculative argument. As with many other elements in the transformation view, we will need to wait and see if these ideas are borne out in new application examples.

5.   The analysis that informs this understanding of supporting conditions does not view the collapse of the Soviet Union as the primary cause of the important