

also to reach a modus vivendi with Washington as the basis for European negotiations lending greater stability to the East-West relationship as a whole. Hence also the use of the Genoa precedent primarily in Soviet internal discussions about policy toward the United States in recent years, as Moscow has displayed a reversible but on the whole a growing interest in accommodation with Washington on the basis of arms control agreements.

From the neo-Stalinist perspective, on the other hand, Europe remains primarily an arena of political-military competition with the United States, one in which offensive goals prevail on either side. If a Soviet objective is to increase West European dependence upon and cooperation with the East in order to loosen and eventually sever the American connection, the purely tactical aspects of the Genoa policy may be utilized not only to justify divisive détente and agreements in Europe against sectarian criticism within the CPSU, but also as a guide to practical action. For instance, late in 1970 the influential political commentator, Yuri Zhukov cited Genoa favourably in calling for broad all-European cooperation that by implication excluded the United States.⁴³ Defining "Europe" as stretching from the Urals to the Atlantic, he drew attention to the activity of Europeanists who urged the creation of a third force between the United States and the Soviet Union, and who to some extent favoured