

(Mr. Dumas, France)

What is essential here is to be assured that the necessarily intrusive character of these procedures does not jeopardize the protection of industrial and trade secrets. In this connection, I should like to say that I attach a great deal of hope to the results of the trial inspections that several countries, including France, are carrying out at present, or have just completed, in their domestic chemical industry.

Second area still to be worked on: legal aspects. I will not dwell on this here. I would just like to recall the need to provide for the best possible articulation between the 1925 Protocol and the future convention.

The third area on which we should focus our attention concerns the institutional aspects: the jurisdiction of the organs to be set up under the future convention, their role in inspection, detecting violations and imposing sanctions, the articulation with existing machinery linked to the organs of the United Nations; the possibility that, through the Scientific Council that France is proposing, the convention may be continuously adapted to technological progress. The French delegation plans to table a document on the Scientific Council shortly, and we hope that you will give it a favourable reception.

The fourth area of difficulty is the definition of the field of negotiation itself, where progress should be possible now that the Soviet Union has announced that it no longer wishes to introduce a fourth category of products to be subject to control. But we have yet to come to an understanding on the exact definitions of the weapons and products that are to be covered, the thresholds considered significant, and especially the way of dealing with new agents which may emerge and cause serious concern. Here I am thinking of the increasingly blurred boundary between chemical weapons and biological weapons, especially in the very difficult area of toxins.

I have kept for the end the fifth area for consideration which, after verification, seems to me the most delicate, not to say the most difficult: it pertains to the transition period during which stocks will be destroyed. It concerns more particularly two problems: maintaining the security of all during the transition, and upgrading the status of the convention. First, upgrading the status of the convention. During the Paris Conference the public will have become aware of one of the political dilemmas that we have yet to solve here: how to make the convention a universal instrument straight away, and not just a bilateral agreement between the two main chemical-weapon Powers. To reduce it to those dimensions, as you well know, would be to fail to achieve our goal.

The Paris Declaration recognizes this clearly, emphasizing the "indispensable universal character" of the convention and calling upon "all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded" - and I emphasize these last six words, which form a key phrase. But we have to devise the necessary inducements for this to be done, so that those who hesitate - either because of fears arising from a specific regional context or because of a concern that the development of their civilian chemical industry will be hampered - will be convinced that the agreement which will be put before them presents no risk to them and is solidly based. And it is there that a comprehensive approach to undiminished security during the transition period