

4. We attempted to impress upon our listeners that we were far from pessimistic about the outcome of the present phase of the war. We pointed out that our visit was in no sense dictated by panic but, on our part, was intended to explore the possibilities of common action in the similar problems of defence that confronted both countries. We stressed the vital importance to both of our countries of the present battle for England. If Great Britain was successful it would mean not only her own survival but a postponement of the possibility of extending the war, other than small raids to our respective eastern shores. We expressed the hope, therefore, that any material assistance which might be offered to us in the present phase of the war would not be taken from stocks ear-marked for Great Britain.

5. Each member of the Canadian Group¹ then explained the basic features of our plan of defence in respect of his own branch of the service and either replied to or made a note of questions asked.

6. This concluded the approach to our conversations which approach we initiated at the request of Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

7. This approach was received in the spirit we had hoped for and all subsequent discussion was carried out with the utmost frankness.

8. It became obvious as soon as discussion began that both Admiral Stark and General Marshall were primarily interested in the facilities available in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland for the use of U.S. sea, land and air forces in that area and that neither of these officers, nor those with them, felt that the U.S. could assist us in the present phase of the war with materiel from service stocks. This latter attitude changed the next morning, particularly in the case of the army.

9. It was obvious, also, that both of the two senior officers referred to, who incidentally are the senior ranking officers in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army respectively, were greatly concerned about the need for the maintenance of the strictest secrecy regarding our conversations. Both indicated that any leak at the present time would be disastrous and would have the effect of curbing any further preparatory co-operative efforts. General Marshall, in particular, felt that a leak at the present time, because of its political consequences, might even force the Administration to cut some of his existing and contemplated appropriations.

10. In spite of this fear both Admiral Stark and General Marshall wanted the conversations to continue the next day at the Navy and War Departments respectively, when maps could be consulted and specific answers given to our questions.

11. In consequence of this decision, Brigadier Stuart spent Friday morning with General Strong, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Commodore Cuffe and Capt. Murray spent the morning at the Navy Department with Captain Hill,

¹ Le brigadier K. Stuart, sous-chef d'état-major général; le capitaine L. W. Murray, sous-chef d'état-major naval et le commodore de l'Air A. A. L. Cuffe.

¹ Brigadier K. Stuart, Deputy Chief of the General Staff; Captain L. W. Murray, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and Air Commodore A. A. L. Cuffe.