

the latter of these forms is in very bad taste. A small, low letter, like the letter *c*, should not end an abbreviation, unless there is some special reason for it; and, in particular, it should not do so when the preceding letter is a tall one, like *t*. The reason is simply that it is not in good taste." Now, it might be suggested that there is as much room for the exercise of good taste in orthography as in the proper sequence of small, low, and tall letters; and we hope it is not because it is deemed a matter of indifference that "Council of Law Reporting" is, in the note to section 582, spelt "*Counsel*."

The most valuable part of Mr. Bishop's work, exclusive of the alphabetical list of books at the end, is probably his oft-repeated injunction to the student to think for himself. It is lamentable to observe the confusion of mind into which a student of average mental calibre is thrown by attempting to learn the law by rote. One who follows Mr. Bishop's advice will advance upon safe ground, and the mental strength acquired will enable him to pursue his way with unabated ardour.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

Admiralty.—Under a statute giving the Admiralty jurisdiction "over any claim of damage done by any ship," the Admiralty has jurisdiction of a cause of damage for personal injuries done by a ship. — *The Sylph*, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 24.

Award.—A cause and all matters in difference were referred by an order which provided that the costs of the reference should abide the event of the award. The arbitrator decided the cause for the defendant, and with regard to the matters in difference, awarded that the plaintiff had a valid claim against the defendant, and the defendant a valid claim against the plaintiff of larger amount, and directed the plaintiff to pay the defendant the difference. The claims were unliquidated, and could not have been set off against one another in an action. *Held*, that the event of the award was wholly in the defendant's favour,

and that he was therefore entitled to the costs.—*Dunhill v. Ford*, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 36.

Banker.—Whether by virtue of the relation between banker and customer, any legal duty is imposed on the banker not to disclose his customer's account, except on a reasonable and proper occasion, so as to give a cause of action without special damage, *quære*.—*Hardy v. Veasey*, Law Rep. 3 Ex. 107.

Bankruptcy.—A husband covenanted in a deed of separation to pay an annuity to his wife, the annuity to cease in the event of future cohabitation by mutual consent. *Held*, that the value of the annuity was not capable of calculation, and that the annuity was therefore not provable under the Bankrupt Acts. — *Mudge v. Rowan*, Law Rep. 3 Ex. 85.

Club.—The rules of a club authorized the committee to call a general meeting, "in case any circumstance should occur likely to endanger the welfare and good order of the club," and provided that any member might be removed by the votes of two-thirds of those present at such meeting. On a bill by a member so removed, praying to be reinstated, *held*, that as, in the judgment of the court, the meeting was fairly called, and the decision was arrived at *bona fide*, and not through caprice, such decision was final, and the court could not interfere.—*Hopkinson v. Marquis of Exeter*, Law Rep. 5 Eq. 63.

Conflict of Laws.—On a bill of exchange payable to order, drawn, accepted, and payable in England, the contract of the acceptor is to pay to an order valid by the law of England; and an indorsee can sue the acceptor in England, under an indorsement valid by the law of England, though the indorsement was made in France, and by the law of France gave the indorsee no right to sue in his own name, and though the indorser (who was also drawer and payee) and the indorsee were, at the time the bill was made and indorsed, domiciled and resident in France.—*Lebel v. Tucker*, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 77.

Contempt.—In a suit for having removed