

Such a scheme would, undoubtedly, raise the whole level of the Militia. It would absorb the Volunteers, as a matter of course, but they need not feel the absorption, and there would be an end of much of the present weariness and disgust in contest with Control about overcoats, leggings, and such matters, not to speak of other more closely affecting £ s. d.

The gross result would be a system, and not a thing of patches and shreds. The Volunteer Militia, as Sir Henry Havelock somewhat whimsically calls it, would muster 320,000 men for service in the British Isles during war. Bounties are suggested for enlistment in the line for the term of a war, ranging from £10 to £30 per man. They would hardly be wanted when the military valour of the nation was so well and carefully cultivated. Behind the Militia there would be a more or less armed nation. The plan would put a stop to competition in recruiting between the Line and the Militia. We require 17,000 recruits a year to keep up our regiments. Could we not obtain them easily by means of the talisman "guaranteed civil employment for the term of your enlistment"? Sir Henry Havelock calculates that in seven or eight years we should obtain a regular Army Reserve, immediately available, of from 70,000 to 80,000 men, of whom 40,000 would be required to fill up the seventy home battalions to war strength. And what of the cost? It is calculable, but we do not care to let off the enthusiasm such a scheme generates into arithmetical tables. It is sufficient to say that it would be worth the money. A scheme is wanted that will fit into our existing plans, respect our prejudices, and give us a valuable Army. The germ thoughts are all here, and we cannot do better than let them fructify. More bogging will be un pardonable. There is a dash of patriotic pride in the soldier's concluding words:—

"I believe such a measure would make us secure at home, respected abroad. It would be the safest and cheapest premium of national insurance we could invest in. Let us show that we are in earnest and we shall never be called upon to put forth our undeniable strength. Our present weakness invites contempt and aggression. If the nation, individually and collectively, is not prepared to make small sacrifices for the general warfare, the sooner we acknowledge ourselves a third rate Power, and call for tenders for some more warlike people to undertake our defence, by contract, the better. It is wiser to look necessity in the face leisurely in time of peace than to be hurried into boundless and unavailing expenditure in some time of dire pressure and disaster."—*Broad Arrow.*

Ships and Seamen.

The question as to unseaworthy ships has become a prominent one in England through the devotion of Mr. Plimsoll, and more recently the danger arising from navigating ships with unseaworthy seamen has attracted a share of public attention. To the use of the "coffin ships"—old hulks ready to fall apart with any ordinary stress of weather—Mr. Plimsoll has done full justice; and we may anticipate that public opinion will ere long compel that such vessels be destroyed or broken up for the general good. It is shown, however, that even with perfectly staunch ships two great causes of danger yet remain. One is overloading, and the other is the employment in too great numbers of ship "hands" who are not

The misfortunes of the Allan line, in its early days, which at one time appeared most discouraging, were due partly to insufficient acquaintance at the time with the peculiarities of the St. Lawrence Gulf navigation, but in a greater degree perhaps to overloading. It took several sharp lessons to make the fact understood that the deeply laden ship, having apparently no more than she could carry when leaving the harbour, would in the Gulf find that she had too much in to carry, so that she could not be "worked" as was desirable in time of danger. That experience, we believe, has been useful, and we here of no more wrecks of vessels of that line. The case of the *La Plata* is a recent instance, it is believed, of wreck from overloading. Before she sailed Mr. Plimsoll received an anonymous letter, stating that the ship, being then more than sufficiently loaded down with her paying cargo, but still coal and stores to take in, which would sink her yet lower in the water. This letter, or a copy of it, he sent to the proper authorities, but because it was anonymous they declined to interfere. The ship sailed, and was wrecked, under circumstances clearly pointing to overloading as the cause. And yet "the authorities" offer not only passive but active opposition to any one who seeks to compel the most obvious precautions.

For want of seaworthy seamen, too, many a good ship goes to the bottom. The *Pall Mall Gazette* thus summarizes an official report as to where seamen for Great Britain's mercantile navy come from. From all causes—inclusive of "natural deaths and retirements"—there is an annual loss of 16,000 men to the mercantile marine. This standing drain is supplied from various sources. First come some 3,500 lads from the apprentice system; next, about as many more from the training ships. There remains the balance of 9,000 to be accounted for, and these for the most part appear to be nondescripts, either with no special training or a training that has been worse than none, and of very inferior stamina. It is this miserable material, according to the official report, that fills the forecastles and endangers British ships, and this material it is desired to replace with something sound and trustworthy. Admiral Rou's pithy remarks recently published, on the difference between the British seamen of fifty years ago and their successors of to-day, who trust in steam machinery more than in knowledge of winds and weather, form a merited rebuke of the degenerate seamanship of our time.

We recollect the statement, made after the ill fated Northfleet was lost in the Channel, that in the supreme moment of danger the greater part of the crew failed utterly to be of any service, as much from their being foreigners unable to understand the orders given, as from their not being really "able seamen." Twenty five years ago, before the destinies of a great Empire were placed in the hands of political economists, every British ship had to be manned by at least two thirds British seamen. Now with the glorious privilege of getting the cheapest service, no matter how worthless, British ships and cargoes worth hundreds of thousands are sent to sea with motley crews gathered from all nations, many of them incapable of understanding orders given in English, and scarcely fit to be trusted on a canal boat. Further, and as the *Gazette* says, Liscars and other natives of warm climates are shipped for the voyage to England, which barely answers if they arrive north in summer. If, however, it be in winter that they near the British coast, the cold either sends them

below "used up," or makes them useless for work in the rigging when danger has to be met. As regards both ships and seamen the Free Trade theory of non interference is proving a huge failure, and even official persistence will not be able to save it much longer from general condemnation.

Garibaldi and his Campaign in the Vosges.

The universal consent of his contemporaries has assigned the title of hero to Garibaldi, and we have little doubt that history will confirm the opinion of those who have thus honoured him. There is something infinitely touching in the story of the man who gave her fairest provinces to Italy, and yet for many years received no reward save that of great renown. The very pecuniary difficulties from which the general has been long, and is still, suffering, lend an extraordinary glamour to the history of his life. That the man who once had the absolute control of the Kingdom of Naples should be not only a poor man, but plunged in extreme poverty is a strange fact, and it is extremely creditable to the Italians that they should have voted him a pension, as they have just done, of £4000 a year for the rest of his life.

But although we acknowledge to the full the services and the virtues of the general, we are not, therefore, bound to refrain from criticising the acts of his life. There are those who think that his career in the Neapolitan provinces was, even from the united Italian point of view, a mistake. It is asserted that it would have been better for the country if, under Cavour's auspices, the time had been waited for when the Two Sicilies would have naturally joined the new Kingdom. The famous march from Reggio to Naples through Calabria was only a repetition of one made in 1799 by Cardinal Ruffo, at the head of a band of reactionaries, aided by English cruisers, the object of which was to overturn the recently established liberal institutions of the capital. That excitable population was then as ready for a change as in Garibaldi's time, and we have little doubt that, in view of the heavy taxation and general discontent of the present day a similar expedition, if it were possible, which it fortunately is not, would be equally successful in 1875. Still, the great credit cannot be removed from Garibaldi that he actually did the deed by which Italy obtained possession of the Neapolitan territory, and that he carried the act through with an unselfishness and simplicity which will make it a subject of admiration for ever. When we turn to the other acts of his life we must not only withhold our praise, but, in common honesty, use words of strong condemnation. Can any one doubt that the campaign of Aspromonte was the work of a mere enthusiast for an idea? Was not the idea itself out of harmony with the greater need of a reconstruction and united mother country? Again, what is his present position with regard to his native land? Does he in any respect differ from the Spanish *Intransigente*—one who, being of a minority, and a very small one, too, in the case, opposes all progress in legislation and consolidation, simply because he cannot have his own impracticable way? The party of the Left, the extreme section of which is headed, though not led, by him, is doing all it can to hinder the majority in their noble task of setting the finances of the country straight, and of procuring public security in the South.