

men. This interference from without, and by men unacquainted, in a great measure, with the merits of the questions under discussion, is a point upon which British Americans are, at present, particularly sensitive; and they are much more disposed to curtail, than to extend it. There is no reason to suppose that, in the event of a Union, such a disposition would be at all lessened. But when such disputes did arise between the Federal and Provincial authorities, or between different Provinces, who would decide them? If the adjudicating power, in such cases, is not to come from without, the presumption is that it will be vested in a Supreme Court, as in the United States. The vesting of such a power in a civil, judicial body, would be another sweeping innovation upon the British Constitution, which recognises no higher authority than Parliament as entitled to deal with questions strictly constitutional. But, apart from these considerations, such a Court must, in cases of serious difficulty—the only cases in which the interposition of its authority would be desirable—prove inefficient; for it cannot possess the power to enforce its own decrees. At all events, the creation of a court endowed with such authority, would be to establish a *fourth* independent ruling power over the people of British America; and, of course, would make still more complicated the complication of difficulties previously existing, and which must always exist where any plurality of rulers have concurrent authority over a nation.

Let us suppose all obstacles to the practicability of a Federal Union to be removed. Is such a Union desirable? The objections to the Federal form of Government are numerous; but the principal of them are owing to a few general causes, simple and easily apprehended. It may be sufficient to point out these causes; for whoever will allow his attention to dwell upon them, for a brief space, can scarcely require a guide to indicate, or explain their numerous results. Some of these objections have been already hinted at. Under a Federal Constitution there must be a want of cohesiveness between the various confederated bodies; and consequently of stability and strength in the Federal Government itself—conditions which, under certain circumstances

which are by no means of rare occurrence in the history of any nation, must soon prove fatal to the existence of the Federal Government. Where two Governments exercise concurrent authority, as is done by the Federal and separate State Governments, questions must arise, even under ordinary circumstances, which will bring them into direct collision. Were such differences to arise upon general questions—upon points of policy affecting, in an equal degree, every section of the Confederation, the people of the individual State whose Government was at issue with the central Government, would be quite as likely to give their support to the one ruling power, as to the other; therefore, in such a case—if such ever should occur—the chances of any serious injury resulting from such differences, are comparatively slight. Yet even, in this case, there would be such a chance. But such collisions would be much more likely to take place upon questions of a local nature, in which the people of the disputant State felt themselves directly and, it may be, peculiarly interested. Here, from the nature of the point at issue, the tendency of affairs would be to make the difference between the antagonistic Governments grow wider. The people of the individual State would here rally round the local Government, and support it to the last extremity; for its interests and their own, would be identical. The political organization of a State, furnishing evidence of the strength of its position relative to the disputed point, and also a certain means of making its power felt, would, almost certainly, prevent its yielding without a struggle. People are, almost invariably, more jealous of any curtailment of their local rights, or privileges, than of those of a more general nature. A national insult will pass unheeded where a slight—perhaps an imaginary one—to a town council, or similar local body, will raise a perfect storm of indignation. There are always local patriots enough in every community, to promote the hostile feelings naturally excited towards any power supposed to be adverse to the interests of that community. Political, internal disputes are usually more difficult of adjustment and more protracted in continuance, than those springing from a nation's