

*Improbability  
of convoys  
in nuclear war*

other weapons equally unsuitable for use without the necessary nuclear ammunition, such as the *Honest John* and *Bomarc*, and without the required sanction of the Government on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

We are now engaged in the most extensive re-equipment process since these mistaken efforts of the Fifties and Sixties. Are we about to repeat this kind of error by failing to clarify the role of our forces first and then deciding precisely what equipment most suits the role? Gellner, who once served in the Department of National Defence and is thus familiar with its kind of planning procedures, expressed his fears as follows:

There is a distinct danger now that Canada should be caught again just as it was almost 20 years ago, only this time an error would be even more expensive. For a change, what is involved is Canada's maritime contribution to NATO. At present, Canada's equipment-procurement policy is predicated on a stated NATO requirement for keeping open in time of war the transatlantic lanes along which troop reinforcements and supplies would supposedly move in huge quantities, just as in World War II.

Preparing for the previous war is one of the characteristics of planning from a purely military standpoint. Convoys of the Second World War type are not probable in the nuclear war of the future. That is why the Americans are building up reserve stocks of other kinds of military hardware in Europe. Why should Canadians not be doing the same thing, rather than opting for expensive anti-submarine naval vessels and aircraft for convoy and anti-submarine warfare missions? As for purchases of tanks, aircraft and other conventional hardware, which have to be updated from time to time, one wonders whether we are making the most of this opportunity to achieve the much needed standardization of equipment in NATO. If Canada were to accept a standard of equipment in which some of its European allies were specializing, such as tanks, why should these allies not reciprocate by accepting Canadian standards for equipment in which Canada specializes, such as STOL (short-takeoff-and-landing) aircraft or hardware best suited to northern climates?

Harriet Critchley's recent article in *International Perspectives* suggests ways in which the Canadian maritime forces' role in Atlantic defence under NATO might be integrated with the relevant commitments under various aspects of Canada's foreign and defence policy. As

a regional maritime power, Canada has special interest in the assertion of domestic jurisdiction and enforcement rights as a coastal state as well as a maritime trading partner and an ocean alliance partner in NATO. All these needs could be related to Canada's responsibilities in its NATO maritime role. Certainly, the U.S., Britain and France have failed to set Canada a good example in putting NATO requirements first.

I recognize that maintaining a balance among these various considerations becomes more rather than less difficult with the growing complexities of the interdependent world society created by the industrial age. Obviously, the proper functioning of this world society requires the kind of strengthened global institutions the United Nations was intended to develop. In the absence of such a world order guaranteeing the prevention of war, regional coalitions like NATO are necessary. But even in existing circumstances NATO must be based on a certain minimum of consensus. There must be agreement not only about its military strategy but also about its policy objectives, in order to retain cohesion among its members and to continue to command the support of public opinion that bears an increasing financial burden as well as military risk.

At the making of NATO, its Canadian founders recognized that Western democracies were vulnerable to more than military power — to economic crises, to political division, to cultural dissent. They tried, therefore, to provide, in Article 2 and through normal diplomacy, a process for consultation including periodic parliamentary conferences and public debates. Again and again, the Western democracies have shown creative flexibility in overcoming their weaknesses at critical moments on the road to their main goal and in maintaining their security without prejudice to their humanist goals.

Communist ideology, on the other hand, has turned out to be a form of idolatry of the national state, expressed through military and political power. Communism as practised in the Soviet Union has also proved incompatible with the creation of a world order demanding a certain concession of national sovereignty in the common interest of survival and prosperity. It has undoubtedly been effective as an engine of national modernization and national power, however, and as such has increasingly yielded to the temptation of militarization coupled with imperialism. The arguments now raging among Communists of different persua-