

strated that the United States was willing to make major East Asian political moves (Nixon's China visit) and unilateral economic policy affecting Japan (textile quotas) without consulting Tokyo. From Tokyo's perspective, the pertinent question over an American military withdrawal from East Asia is how a joint Japanese-American defence of Japan can be achieved if the Indochina debacle marks the beginning of a complete U.S. military exodus?

### Effects on Japan

Japan's defence policy over the last 25 years has been premised on the maintenance of some U.S. forces in the region as well as on the Japanese islands themselves. This American presence and its attendant nuclear umbrella have permitted Japan to limit rearmament severely and devote the bulk of its efforts to economic development at home and trade and investment abroad. If U.S. forces were to leave, however, two polar tendencies would be encouraged in Japan: at one extreme, reversion to unarmed neutrality, as advocated by the Japan Socialist Party, and, at the other, interest in large-scale rearmament, including the development of nuclear weapons.

The United States opposes both these possibilities; and Secretary of Defence Schlesinger, in the 1975 annual defence report, reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, citing the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan as indispensable to Northeast Asian security. Nevertheless, Japanese officials, like their Philippine counterparts, expressed dismay at the U.S. failure to help South Vietnam and Cambodia in their crises. And Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Washington specifically for a reaffirmation of the American commitment to defend Japan and maintain the nuclear umbrella, both of which were reiterated by Kissinger and Ford.

Indonesia, as the key island state in Southeast Asia, has expressed no undue concern over Indochinese developments. Indeed, Foreign Minister Malik voiced his belief that Vietnamese Communism has its own identity and could peacefully coexist with the five ASEAN countries, thereby helping Southeast Asia to gain strength in confronting great-power influence in the region.

America's experience in Indochina over the past 20 years has demonstrated the limited applicability of conventional military force against a non-industrialized peasant state in a war in which there were no front lines and whose primary criterion of success was the allegiance and/or con-

trol of population rather than territory. Paradoxically, the use of force in unfavourable political circumstances actually led to a loss of power for the United States. The contrast between America's ability to preserve the status quo *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. in the Cuban missile crisis or over Berlin and its inability to deal with North Vietnam is startling but not unlike the Soviet's inability to deal with Yugoslavia or Albania. Weak countries with a strong sense of national pride can make the use of force against themselves most unattractive because their capacity for resistance makes the price of victory too high for the outsider.

### Future role

America's future role in Asian security is ambiguous. Some combination of air, naval and amphibious forces will probably remain in East Asia (Japan, the R.O.K. and the Philippines) through the remainder of the 1970s. Their purpose will be to serve as part of the global balance with the Soviet Union, to deter direct or indirect Soviet intervention in local crises and, more important, to induce Soviet co-operation in the peaceful solution of such crises if they arise. American security policy for the late 1970s must depend increasingly on a peaceful configuration of interests and power among local states rather than any direct American intervention. U.S. diplomacy, then, must depend primarily on the instruments of trade, investment and economic and military assistance.

For the remainder of non-Communist Asia, the lesson Indochina has taught is that future security arrangements will have to be indigenous and based on some combination of creating the domestic political and social conditions necessary to undermine any significant popular support for insurgencies while engaging in border-control operations with neighbours to insure that the availability of external sanctuaries is minimized. (Co-operation between Malaysia and Thailand and Malaysia and Indonesia are good examples.)

As for the Vietnamese Communist victory itself, since one American goal of involvement in Indochina in the beginning was to "contain" China, then a strong, satisfied Vietnamese-controlled Indochina on the border of the PRC might well effect a similar end. If so, then the bitterest irony of all over these past 20 years has been that America chose as its adversary the one Asian political movement that could best have achieved its China-containment policy.

*U.S. inability to deal with North Vietnam similar to Soviet inability with Yugoslavia*

*Asian security in future must be indigenous*