

jolly good thrashing which they have needed so much ever since they began to flaunt the star-spangled banner. They will not make it a *casus belli* that the King of the Sandwich Islands acknowledges the Queen of Britain as his imperial sovereign. They will not feel in honour bound to resist our acquisition of control over their rejected Hispaniola, separated as it is from their territory by the long group of British Bahamas and surrounded by islands already in European hands. The republic of Santo Domingo, which contains the largest and finest part of the island, is not very eager to maintain its independence, has already sought admission into the United States, and would probably be very glad to be protected by the United Kingdom. At any rate it will not demand anything exorbitant for ceding Samana Bay, one of the most important harbours in the world, and necessary, like Egypt, the Sandwich Islands, and either Nicaragua or Darien, to the power which wishes to be really mistress of the seas, able to maintain fleets and secure uninterrupted passage for its trade on every important portion of the globe's aqueous surface. Nicaragua will be the most difficult of all to acquire. That wretched product of Whiggish weakness—worse even than the Ashburton Treaty—the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, as revised in 1859, surrendered our protectorate of the Mosquito Coast, and tied our hands against annexation of Central America, or obtaining control of that great western gateway of war and commerce. But as the Yankees have violated their engagement, in spirit if not in letter, by successfully negotiating for the sole right of making and using a canal through the isthmus of Darien, we have a very plausible ground for demanding another revision of the treaty and perhaps release us from our engagement. The Yankees have no more commercial interest in, or natural connection with, the Central American trade route, than we have. It is too much, therefore, that they should have full command of one of two possible canals, and be able to prevent us from using the other in time of war. Having a disbanded army, a dismantled navy, a large population of disaffected subjects, and no Canada to attack, they will be much more willing than in 1859 to listen to reason. Though they may chafe at our progress, they will not be so