

*Government Orders*

It is on this specific point that I hope that he would bring the same forthright expression of his views to bear as he has on the question of sanctions. I find it a difficult position for the Parliament of Canada to be debating the resolution we are when an argument is being advanced by a front-line spokesman for the Liberal Party and someone with a lot of knowledge about this subject, contending that these resolutions, which form the basis of the collective approach that all the nations are taking against the Iraqi occupation and annexation of Kuwait, are somehow inconsistent with the charter. I have a lot of trouble with that point. I ask him if he can clarify it.

**Mr. Axworthy (Winnipeg South Centre):** Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. parliamentary secretary for his comments. I will attempt to clarify the point I was making.

In my speech I did not say all resolutions. I said that the resolutions beginning with 660 up to those which require the different participating countries to monitor and enforce the sanctions for military purposes were in accordance with the charter, using article 41 under chapter VII. It is with resolution 678 that I have trouble, because under the charter article 41 clearly states that the Security Council is empowered to advance an economic embargo and that member states are required to adhere to it.

Article 42 states that the Security Council must then consider whether the sanction or embargo is working and, if in its judgment it is not working, it triggers articles 43, 44, 45, and 46, which is to engage in the development of a military action. This means the setting up of a UN military high command which then requests from individual countries contributions of both air and ground troops. It then puts that package together and says that it is now prepared to use military action.

That would have been both the preferred method and the method that we should have advocated as Canadians. First, it sets out a clear protection that accountability and decision making in determining whether or not sanctions are working are for the UN to make. Second, the decision on military force is again that of the UN Security Council, and the military high command is subject to it. That in fact was what took place in the Korean war.

What we are saying is that 678 is a hybrid resolution. I am not saying it violates. I am saying it is hybrid. It is outside that very clear-cut set of procedures under chapter VII in articles 41, 42, et cetera. That is what gives me great concern, in that we are sort of buying resolution 678 as being the answer when I think it creates serious problems for us as Canadians. First, there is no mechanism for deducing or judging whether or not sanctions are working and the UN has not in any way dealt with that issue. It has not given any kind of assessment, publicly at least, on that issue as it is required to do under articles 41 and 42.

Second, resolution 678 leaves it up to individual initiatives to use military force. That creates, as my colleague said today in Question Period, substantial confusion as to who is in command, who is in control, and who makes decisions. For many countries that are quite nervous about this fact it is turning over a kind of UN mandate to a couple of large countries to determine how to use it.

That is why I find 678 to be a maverick resolution and one that I think we should have objected to. I still think that we should have time to go back and say: "Now that the January 15 date has been met, let's bring the charter into play. Let's use 42, 43 and 44." That does not in any way back off from the clear message to Saddam Hussein that if sanctions do not work and he does not clear out ultimately there may be military action, but it will be done clearly under the UN charter and not outside it.

[*Translation*]

**The Acting Speaker (Mr. DeBlois):** Resuming debate. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence.

**Mr. Jean-Guy Hudon (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Defence):** Mr. Speaker, one of the most remarkable aspects of the gulf crisis is the unanimity of the international community on the need for ending the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. There is no better example of the post-cold-war situation than the debates in the UN Security Council, where delegates from Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union voted together to support the most strongly worded resolutions to come out of the Security Council since the Korean War.