

*S.O. 30*

Indeed, the forces of that invasion must have already been in motion.

● (2120)

**Mr. Lawrence:** Why did you think they did not tell you?

**Mr. Regan:** The Hon. Member asks why I think they did not tell us. They did not tell us for similar reasons they did not tell Mexico, or Trinidad which had also indicated its opposition to the action, and for the same reason that they did not adequately tell Great Britain or any of the other countries. Apparently they consulted only the countries that indicated in earlier meetings that they were in favour of a military invasion. They did not consult with Canada because they felt that the doubts that have been expressed in this House, and indeed the doubts that exist in the minds of many Members of the Conservative Party, would have been reflected in the advice we would have given.

**Mr. Beatty:** Because they did not trust you.

**Mr. Regan:** The Hon. Member says they did not trust us. I say to him through you, Mr. Speaker, that I would not want anyone to trust me to give a blanket endorsement of an invasion in which people were going to be killed.

**The Acting Speaker (Mr. Blaker):** Order. I wonder if the Minister of State for International Trade might care to seek the unanimous consent of the House to continue his remarks. At the moment his time has expired.

**Some Hon. Members:** Agreed.

**The Acting Speaker (Mr. Blaker):** I gather there is unanimous consent.

**Mr. Regan:** I am indebted to Hon. Members for allowing me the time. We believed there was an unseemingly hurry to follow the course that carried hazards for civilians, including our civilians, which created an unfortunate precedent for other countries whose motives may be most worthy. I want to make it quite clear; I want no mistake about it: I admire the great republic to our south. I admire the United States and I value the friendship of the United States. But as a Canadian, I am not prepared to endorse automatically every action that they take regardless of an examination of its merit.

Since the invasion there seems to be a situation in which the understanding by the American authorities—and they chose this course to the extent of military opposition—appears to have been followed. It would appear that their intelligence indicated a much easier situation than occurred. But, of course, it is the sort of danger that comes with military intervention because intelligence can often be faulty. In that case the sacrifice or the loss can be greater than anticipated.

There are many aspects of this web that could be examined, but I am now trespassing on the time of the House. Rather than review in any more detail the motivation or the situation that has existed, I want to deal with the reality of the fact that an invasion has occurred, or a military intervention; the word

“invasion” has been used by the American authorities. I want to say that the most useful thing this House can do is to direct its attention toward efforts that may help to restore peace and self-determination for the people of Grenada.

We look to the future. The Prime Minister stated in the House this afternoon that no direct request has been made to us by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth to participate in a Commonwealth peace-keeping force, but that Secretary General Ramphal had made general suggestions along these lines publicly and to Commonwealth members. The Prime Minister indicated that he has been attempting to communicate with certain Commonwealth leaders to explore the same type of idea. As Hon. Members will recall, during Question Period today he indicated he spoke by telephone to Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain on this and other related subjects.

If an election is to take place after the hostilities cease and the invading troops leave Grenada, quite presumably some kind of Commonwealth force will be required, the Prime Minister stated. He offered, subject to the approval of Cabinet, to participate in such an observation of an election. He further said that if hostilities are prolonged, he would even go further and suggest that we could call for a truce, ask all foreign nationals to leave and then the Commonwealth could send in an observer force to ensure that the peace is respected. This may be a direction in which Canada can be helpful.

Governor General Scoon is the continuing link with legitimacy on the island of Grenada. That is the case whether he asked for outside intervention or not, and there is considerable controversy and doubt on that question at this hour. However, the Governor General is the representative of Her Majesty the Queen in a Commonwealth country and has a legitimate position. Since 1979, no other authorities have been popularly elected on that island, although there apparently was widespread support for the Bishop Government.

Subsequent to the Question Period today, I have spoken to the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Mr. Ramphal, by telephone. I told him on behalf of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) that we endorse his comments in relation to a role for the Commonwealth, as Grenada is a Commonwealth country and Canada is the senior Commonwealth member in this hemisphere. I conveyed to Mr. Ramphal our support and our willingness to participate in any peace force that the Commonwealth should establish to be helpful in Grenada.

I further indicated that the Canadian Government would be willing to assist in consultations with other Commonwealth countries, if that should be considered by the Secretary General to be helpful. After thanking me for our reaction, he undertook to be in further contact with us within the next few hours.

It is difficult at this point in time to know exactly what will evolve in the coming days. Indeed, the Americans, who are militarily in the island, will obviously have a point of view. We believe, however, that the sooner a healthy determination by the people of Grenada can freely take place the better, and