

is then no difference from CWA which are today classified, in terms of toxicity, as supertoxic lethal chemicals. These data point to the indispensability of applying chemical, physical and biological methods of detection and identification for the purpose of verifying binary weapons in the course of production and stockpiling. The application of the cited methods is also very important when monitoring and proving the existence of activities linked with the verification of possible use of chemical weapons as well as for the monitoring of the destruction of CWA stocks in general. On the other hand, the combining of chemical, physical and biological methods creates the conditions for a credible verification of the existence or use of chemical weapons. The implementation of verification will be facilitated if agreement is reached with regard to the standardization of methods because results from several laboratories could then be compared and reproduced.

The verification of chemical weapons should, in our opinion, be implemented on the basis of a national and international procedure, where we consider that national verification does not preclude international verification but rather that they complement each other. In order to increase confidence among countries, it is possible that both national and international verification be based on an agreed, generally acceptable and unified identification system - methods that would be standardized for particular CWA categories. This, of course, does not preclude a separate national approach especially when a country has qualified personnel, equipment and organization in the gathering of samples, data processing and other. The standardizing of the methods of international verification can greatly facilitate the national verification system and chemical defense measures, in those countries as well which have no experience in developing their own verification methods. The standardizing of verification methods presupposes their periodical modification in accordance with scientific and technological progress. It is understandable that the introduction of new methods and procedures should be subject to agreement and acceptance on the part of an international organ created by the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In our view the arms reduction and disarmament agreements must be founded on reasonable confidence, as is the case with some existing agreements. If there is a decrease in confidence or if there is doubt concerning the violation of agreements, then only verification measures can restore confidence among States Parties to the agreements. This is particularly true for the countries which possess production facilities and stockpiles of chemical weapons because the arms race, which is usually motivated by acquiring arms advantage or is justified by the need to not lag behind in the creation of new weapons, is most often initiated by these countries.