

Other arms-control regimes, in addition to the NPT, might benefit indirectly from this research. These other arms-control contexts include most existing or proposed accords on conventional forces, chemical weapons, and space-based weapons.

In summary, the aim of this project is to contribute to an assessment of current and potential levels of cost-effectiveness of inspections of nuclear materials and activities. This assessment is timely, in view of recent events and of the impending (1995) NPT Extension Conference. A further purpose is to raise ideas about how, despite budgetary constraints, the IAEA can fulfil its mandate to deter, or detect in a timely fashion, not only diversion of nuclear materials, but also undeclared facilities and activities. It is hoped that the results will also help to improve cost-effectiveness of other forms of arms-control inspection, thereby making arms control better and cheaper

This report represents the results of a research project conducted under the Department of Foreign Affairs' Verification Research Program. It is being shared with interested parties as part of a long-standing Canadian policy to make such research findings available to assist in negotiations and to promote a dialogue on these important issues. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Canadian Government.