

reduce the fear, misunderstanding, and insecurity that, we argue, are so often responsible for escalation to war. Reassurance dictates that defenders try to communicate their benign intentions and their interest in alternative ways of addressing the issues in dispute.<sup>133</sup>

Reassurance, like deterrence, can be divided into immediate and general reassurance. General reassurance is designed to alter an adversary's calculations of the relative advantages of the use of force in comparison to other alternatives. It attempts to shift the trajectory of a conflict and to encourage an adversary to restructure and reframe a problem by creating alternatives to the use of force. Immediate reassurance, like immediate deterrence, seeks to prevent an anticipated challenge to a specific commitment. It attempts to reduce adversarial perceptions of hostility, the domestic pressures to act, the workings of the security dilemma abroad, and the likelihood of miscalculation.

We have identified and intend to study five strategies of reassurance that vary in the scope of their objectives.<sup>134</sup> The most ambitious strategies of reassurance seek to shift the trajectory of the conflict and create alternatives to a use of force. One strategy designed to initiate a process of reciprocal cooperation, "tit for tat," has recently received a great deal of attention.<sup>135</sup> A strategy of reciprocal concessions can be

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<sup>133</sup> Strategies of reassurance are conceptually distinct from cooperation and negotiation. Cooperation between adversaries on security issues can take place across a broad spectrum of issues even when the parties do not consider a use of force likely. See Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Negotiation generally refers to the exchange of proposals to reach mutually satisfactory joint agreements in a situation of interdependence. A reassurance strategy is closer to one of "prenegotiation," that attempts to make negotiation a salient and attractive option; it is used in the process of getting to the table rather than at the table itself. See Janice Gross Stein, ed. *Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

<sup>134</sup> Lebow and Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," pp.41-63, and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence And Reassurance," describe these strategies in detail.

<sup>135</sup> Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Conflict* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), pp.1-28; Deborah W. Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987), pp.27-60, and "The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations," in Janice Gross Stein, ed. "International Negotiation: A Multi-disciplinary Perspective," *Negotiation Journal* 4 (July 1988), pp.281-301.