

3. The principle of *transparency* should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction, we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations and will work for its early adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure.

4. The principle of *consultation* should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines that are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons. We welcome the recent opening of discussions on this subject. These include the encouraging talks in Paris among the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council on 8-9 July, as well as ongoing discussions within the framework of the European Community and its Member States. Each of us will continue to play a constructive part in this important process, in these and other appropriate fora.

5. The principle of *action* requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end, all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilizing or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of particular concern. A special effort should be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced weapons, to the transfer of which similar restraints could be applied. All states should take steps to ensure that these criteria are strictly enforced. We intend to give these issues our continuing close attention.

6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing Gulf War illustrate the huge costs to the international community of military conflict. We believe that moderation in the level of military expenditure is a key aspect of sound economic policy and good government. While all countries are struggling with competing claims on scarce resources, excessive spending on arms of all kinds diverts resources from the overriding need to tackle economic development. It can also build up large debts without creating the means by which these may be serviced. We note with favour the recent report issued by the United Nations Development Program and the recent decisions by several donor countries to take account of military expenditure where it is disproportionate when setting up aid programs and encourage all other donor countries to take similar action. We welcome the attention that the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the World Bank have recently given to excessive military spending, in the context of reducing unproductive public expenditure.

Non-proliferation

7. We are deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the non-proliferation regimes.

8. Iraq must fully abide by Security Council Resolution 687, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its nuclear, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities, as well as for verification and long-term monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the relevant UN resolutions, we will provide every assistance to the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that they can fully carry out their tasks.

9. In the nuclear field, we:

- re-affirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in

favour of an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

- re-affirm the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call on all other non-signatory states to subscribe to this agreement;
- call on all non-nuclear-weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, which are the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime;
- urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South Africa to the NPT.

10. Each of us will also work to achieve:

- our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the NPT regime beyond 1995;
- a strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system;
- new measures in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use items.

11. We anticipate that the Biological Weapons Review Conference in September will succeed in strengthening implementation of the Convention's existing provisions by reinforcing and extending its confidence-building measures and exploring the scope for effective verification measures. Each of us will encourage accession to the Convention by other states and urge all parties strictly to fulfil their obligations under the convention. We each believe that a successful Review Conference leading to strengthened implementation of the BTWC would make an important contribution to preventing the proliferation of biological weapons.

12. The successful negotiation of a strong, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons, to which all states subscribe, is the best way to prevent the spread of