

Nations Special Committee which investigated this matter for many months, has the best chance of success of any that has been submitted to us; the best chance of bringing peace and order to that torn and troubled country. In that spirit, Mr. Chairman, our delegation will support the plan of Sub-committee I.

L. Canadian Statement, November 26, 1947

PARTITION PLAN FOR PALESTINE

I should like to state as simply and briefly as possible the position of my Government and delegation on the resolution before the General Assembly. We are voting for the partition plan because, in our judgment, it is the best of four unattractive and difficult alternatives. These alternatives are to do nothing, to set up a unitary Arab state in accordance with the plan of Sub-committee II, to set up a federal state in accordance with the minority recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, and partition.

Let me take these one by one. First, the objections to doing nothing are obvious. For the United Nations to do nothing in this situation would be an abdication, a shirking of its responsibilities in a situation which is pregnant with peril to peace. It would invite not only confusion but widespread violence involving not merely the people of Palestine but people elsewhere. It would, not improbably, result in bloodshed and a kind of irregular and murderous warfare which might spread far. We dismiss this first alternative as not worthy of the United Nations, as highly dangerous in its probable consequences—indeed, as virtually unthinkable.

The second alternative is to set up a unitary Arab state along the lines recommended by Sub-committee II of the *ad hoc* Committee, or, at least, to let such a unitary Arab state emerge at the time of the termination of the mandate. This course would have been the normal and natural one to pursue had it not been for the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations mandate, the encouragement given to the immigration of Jews into Palestine over a quarter of a century, the establishment of a well-rooted community of nearly 700,000 Jews in Palestine who, as we are told, have invested there \$600,000,000, and the devotion on the part of Jews all over the world to the idea of a Jewish National Home in a country which once, at least, was a Jewish land. These factors cannot be ignored. They make the Palestine problem *sui generis* and unique, and they constitute a vital flaw in the otherwise unanswerable Arab case. It is because of these factors that the project of a unitary state has been repeatedly dismissed by a multiplicity of commissions on the Palestine problem, of which the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was the latest, and decisively rejected by the *ad hoc* Committee. There is not a chance that this alternative can find acceptance by any but a small minority of the nations of the world. As a solution by this General Assembly it is, therefore, beyond the realm of the practical.

Similarly, the third alternative—a federal state—while, in our judgment, more defensible than the one which I have just discussed, has made very little appeal in this organization. Espoused by Yugoslavia, which has