

Europe (though he had actually formed a plan for making Paris the European Capital), but at the ejection of England from Colonial Empire, and the installation of France in her place. It is singular, in that case, that he should have made over Louisiana to the United States. He may have exclaimed "Old Europe bores me"; but his visionary aspirations pointed not to America but to Asia, where he was on his way to found an Empire when his march was arrested at Acre by Sir Sydney Smith, who he always said had made him miss his destiny. How was it that of all the statesmen and soldiers who played a part in these events, of all the contemporary writers who chronicled or discussed them, not one should have betrayed his consciousness of what we are now told was their real import? Why England directed her attacks against the transmarine dependencies of the other powers is obvious enough; she was strong at sea, while they were strong on land. It was only after failing in descents on France that Chatham turned his arms against Canada. His son, in the same manner, sent out his fleets to capture the Colonial dependencies of France and her vassal allies, because they were open to maritime attack, while he was unable to make head against the French armies on the battle-fields of Europe. The "Expansion of England" by Pitt was, if ever anything was, an accident of war. How could he have supposed that in annexing a number of sugar islands, peopled with negroes, he was extending what Professor Seeley calls "the English nation"? Going further back, there appears no ground for saying that the Colonial policy of the Protector was "Imperialist"; it seems rather, so far as there is any trace of it, to have been Emancipationist: he practically recognized the independence of New England; and, when he had conquered Jamaica, offered it to the New Englanders as a more genial place of settlement. His object in conquering it, and the object of his operations generally in that quarter was, no doubt, to break the Spanish monopoly, and open those waters to English enterprise; but this is different from the object of Imperial Federation. It is surely surprising that Professor Seeley can represent the policy of Charles II., in making war upon Holland, as a continuation of the policy of the Protectorate. Has he forgotten the vassalage of Charles II. to Louis XIV., and the hatred borne by the Catholic despot to the Protestant Republic? Cromwell, instead of making war upon Holland, had made peace with her as soon as he got power into his hands; and he would be wronged if his policy were judged by that of Shaftesbury, one of the unscrupulous cynics always engendered by the catastrophe of a revolution, when Shaftesbury had entered the service of the Restoration. The foundation of New England, the vital germ of the whole, had nothing to do with English policy; it was the work of religious refugees. By the rulers it was opposed, while, had the popular party been in the ascendant, the refugees would have stayed at home. England faced the new world across the Atlantic, and her people were seafaring: otherwise the transmission of her race and institutions to America by the crew of the *Mayflower* was as accidental as the seed dropped by a bird. An entirely new version of history is always suspicious and, when it comes wedded to a political theory, it is pretty sure to be the offspring of fancy, though of a fancy, it may be, learned and ingenious.

In so motley a series of acquisitions and accretions as that which includes New England, Virginia, Canada, the Cape of Good Hope, the West Indies, Mauritius, Malta, Australia and India, it is surely vain to look for any uniform aim or policy beyond that desire of aggrandizement which a better understanding of the true conditions of national strength and happiness, as well as the progress of morality, has taught us to regard as belonging rather to the past than to the present; nor will the want of real unity be supplied by casting over the whole of the scattered and heterogeneous multitude of dependencies the dragnet of a collective name, such as "Greater Britain." That name is not applicable to India, as Professor Seeley seems aware, though he cannot help bringing in India in order to make up the bulk of Britons outside the British Islands necessary to support the title; his exclusive regard for political aggregations under the sway of Downing Street preventing him from seeing that morally he may have a real "Greater Britain" in the reviving affection of the people of the United States for the ancient home of their race. It is not applicable to Mauritius, or any of the military dependencies: barely applicable to the negro-peopled West Indies, to South Africa, where the British are but a section of the European population which is itself greatly outnumbered by the natives; or even to French Canada, the nationality of which is not as Professor Seeley supposes dying out, and ceasing to stand in the way of British consolidation, but on the contrary becoming more intense and territorially gaining ground, the vital force of British Canada being insufficient for its assimilation. No verbal generalization will impart likeness to things radically different from each other, or make it politic to deal with them in the same way. There is a political as well as a philosophical Realism; and, while the Realism of the

Schoolmen bred nothing worse than metaphysical chimeras, the Realism of the politician may lead to practical errors. "The growth of our Empire," says Professor Seeley, "may, indeed, have been in a certain sense natural; Greater Britain, compared to old England, may seem but the full-grown giant developed out of the sturdy boy; but there is this difference, that the grown man does not and cannot think of becoming a boy again, whereas England both can and does consider the expediency of emancipating her Colonies and abandoning India." We might as well say of a man that he was considering the expediency of putting his full-grown son out in the world and separating from his wife. India, to which alone the term Empire, properly belongs, as the Queen has shown in assuming the title of Empress, has nothing in common with the British and self-governed Colonies, nor are the arguments for and against the abandonment of India identical with the arguments for and against the emancipation of the Colonies, except in respect of the military danger and expenditure which the defence of distant dependencies may in both cases entail. India, if England retired and withdrew her armies, would be totally lost, and with it would be lost the vast Indian investments of Englishmen, including the India debt and the railway stock, besides all those posts in the Indian service which form so splendid a part of the heritage of English youth; while the country, full of hostile races and religions, would become again a prey to the murderous and devastating anarchy in which it was weltering when the British first appeared on the scene. The Colonies instead of being lost by emancipation would be retained and perhaps improved for all purposes of usefulness and of a really grand ambition. Their attachment to the Mother Country would not be diminished; probably it would be increased, as it has certainly grown with their progress in self-government; and they would afford just as good homes as ever to the British emigrant. The privilege of controlling their commercial policy in her own interest England has already resigned. Even of the political connection, that part which alone is genuine and abiding, mutual citizenship might, and it is to be hoped would, remain as before. To the Colonies themselves the change would be merely the crowning of an edifice of self-government already in substance complete. Instead of lapsing into confusion and being overrun by Pindarrees and Mahrattas, they would be conscious of no political alteration except the warm flow of national life in their veins. Nothing would be sacrificed except that mysterious entity, which, having no name in English, is called by the French name of prestige—derived from a Latin word which means a conjuring trick or imposture—and against this England will have, whenever she makes up her mind, to balance the unique glory of freely and deliberately giving existence to a nation.

Professor Seeley holds that the secession of the American Colonies, or as he calls it, the "schism in the Greater Britain," was caused solely by the defects of the old Colonial policy, but for which, apparently, he thinks the United States might at this day be a British dependency under a Governor sent out by the Colonial Office. It might have been supposed that only in the bosom of Colonial officialism was this fond belief still cherished. Horace Walpole, apart from his personal prejudices, was one of the most clear-sighted men of his time, and his very dilettanteism preserved him from those exclusively parliamentary views of things by which Professor Seeley complains that the true significance of this portion of history has been obscured. To him it appeared plain that the American Revolution was the inevitable severance from the Old Country of a community too large even in that day to be governed, at least as to free principle, from a distance. Professor Seeley says that steam and electricity have "abolished distance," but this is rhetoric: steam and electricity have not abolished the Irish Channel, or even Lake Superior, much less the Atlantic; nor have they abolished, as Professor Seeley himself confesses with sorrow, the ignorant indifference of the mass of British citizens to Colonial affairs. He more than once points to the extension of the United States as a "proof that territorial expansion may be indefinite"; but he forgets that between Vermont and Texas there flows no ocean, and that oceans are obstacles to unity, especially in case of maritime war. He wastes words in proving that American prosperity is not the consequence of secession but of qualities manifested by the people before that event, combined with the natural wealth of the country. But independence gave America national life, without which what a mass of pork and pumpkin pie that vast community would be! Unless Professor Seeley admits this acquisition to have been momentous, it is difficult to see how he can attach such enormous importance as he does attach to the American Revolution, which he pronounces superior in pregnancy even to the Revolution in France; though to most readers of history it would probably appear that American Democracy was really founded by the first settlers in New England and that its separation from the monarchical and aristocratic England, on the other side of the Atlantic, was merely a ques-