

mon with that of mankind, or to affirm that their opponents are actuated by an unmanly sentimentalism.

First, there is the principle that should govern man's conduct in relation to animals. Without swearing to the words of any teacher, or committing one's self to any school, it may be laid down as a truth that life is a struggle, a struggle with fellow men, with living beings, animals and plants, and with the lifeless forces around us. The conditions in which men find themselves inevitably lay upon them this burden, and they are obliged to use the means they find around them in this struggle, amongst which are the lives of animals. If, then, man is to prosper he must kill animals, it may be tigers, sheep, or vermin. It is a duty imposed upon him by nature, even if a painful duty, but self-preservation demands it. The rule cannot be laid down that an animal may be killed for one purpose and not for another, that life may be taken to gratify an appetite or nourish the body, but not to increase the existing store of knowledge or benefit the mind.

The only test is whether the death of an animal is likely to be of benefit to society at large. Man must be fed; he is justified in killing and eating sheep; man's success in this struggle for existence depends on superior knowledge; he is justified in killing a frog or rabbit if it can be shown that human knowledge is thereby enlarged. But he is not justified in causing pain if it can be avoided, or unless pain is of advantage to him. Death is painful in itself, but that does not mean he is to abstain from killing; it means that he is to kill with the least possible pain. One could imagine a costly system of anæsthetizing animals about to be slaughtered, but no one has shown it to be practicable, just as a surgeon may not find it practicable to administer chloroform where some local anæsthetic like cocaine or the ether spray would serve the purpose nearly as well.

It was pointed out that to justify vivisection the information must be obtainable in no other way. Let this be qualified by saying "in no other reasonable way;" and, to illustrate, place the only two means that are in any way reasonable side by side. Take cholera, for example, in which experiments have been conducted on both principles. On the one side are the scientific infection experiments of Thiersch and others following him, performed by vivisection; on the other hand are the popular experiments which have at various times been performed during cholera on human beings, by companies supplying them with water and other commodities. Even the most confirmed antivivisectionist will commend the former way. But even if this knowledge could be arrived at in "some other way" at some future period, what of the suffering and death that must in the meantime come to the human race? What of those who must