

duction,—“Without peculiarly distinguishing resemblance of relations.” This appears to be the meaning which Butler attaches to it. “It has to be shown, in the two cases asserted to be analogous, that the same law is really operating.” “We need only show you,” says a modern writer, “to the parables of the New Testament for illustrative analogies, showing resemblance of relations.” And the facility with which the perceptive creation affords them, suggests the thought of that deep and divinely established harmony between the natural and the spiritual worlds, the reality of which it is the object of this work to establish. If this, then, be analogy, its usefulness will consist solely in answering objections—in silencing these objections. Its province is not to elicit truth, but to ward off the missiles which may be cast at it. It is not required of it to refute what is proposed, but to stand on the defensive, and to repel refutations. It has a shield, but no sword; it will defend vulnerable parts, but it cannot kill the foe. Analogy appears to be of two kinds, as it were,—(1.) A negative designed to silence objections; (2.) What might be called a positive presumption, adducing those principles which may reasonably be broached. Yet the resultant, we presume, is not mere negation, for the effect produced upon one's own mind is certainly a positive conviction of the truthfulness of the argument; and although, in many instances, Butler's choice of language is uncouth, and his ideas couched in language which is almost unfathomable, yet, when a glimpse of the reasoning is obtained, all former pains are thrice repaid, doubts vanish, fondest hopes are strengthened and animated, and the believer is enabled to understand more fully,—“That the invisible things of God from the creation are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

In the introduction to the analogy, Butler takes up that which we have already noticed, viz.:—analogical reasoning in general. This he does by showing, in the first place, its nature; secondly, the many uses to which it is applied; thirdly, when it is used, what value should be applied to it.

II. It can be used with propriety in the proof of religion. If religion and the constitution of nature have the same divine source, and we find difficulties in both, then whatever argument overthrows the one overturns the other, and *vice versa* if so be that an analogy can be perceived between them. Again, this mode of argument is far superior to hypothesis or speculation, in as much as it is right to argue from cognizant facts, to those that are like them—from what now lies within our reach as certain events to those that shall be—from what we now behold with the mental, moral, and corporeal eye, to what lies in the far-beyond. But to suggest either to yourself or to others, how the world ought to have been made, or might have been made, otherwise than it is framed, is a speculation not to be indulged in. Or to lay down a hypothesis for a case to which it is not applicable,—the same as reasoning upon imaginary principles, or which, if they do not exist, have no foundation for their being, but are supposed for accommodation.

CHAPTER I.

This proposition is laid down to point out, analogically,—“That man is appointed to live in a future state.” This is the main-stay of natural religion. Shall there be a future state of existence? It is the foundation of our hopes and fears.

It is a universal law of the natural world which constantly comes beneath our notice, and therefore a fact, that every creature has an embryonic state as a

living being, capable of thought, life, and sensation. That it passes through different stages of existence without losing its identity. If such be the case, then, why may we not exist hereafter in a condition and position as different from the present as our present state is from that of helpless infancy? May not this life be one of a series of changes? May we not, like the caterpillar, undergo a transformation; leave moral and physical deformity behind, and be clothed in new beauty; having old relations dis severed; being placed in a new element, and breathing the atmosphere of a pure and spiritual world? Certainly we may.

We are living beings now. We have powers both latent and active. This needs no proof. Consciousness proclaims it. Now the presumption is that these powers and springs of action will continue to be hereafter. Objection. “It is probable that death may destroy our living powers.”

I. Ans. This must be probable, if there be any probability in the case, upon two grounds.

1st. That it is reasonable to make such a supposition. But reason has no lot or part in the matter, for who knows what death is? By what chemical analysis have the ingredients which enter into its composition been discovered? What are its operations when it overthrows “the earthly house of this tabernacle?” None can answer, for only some of the results of its operations are known, therefore our knowledge is limited to observation; nor can we go beyond this boundary unless we are aware upon what our living powers depend. If these assertions be true, then all which the reason of the thing teaches us is simply the effect of death upon animal bodies; but, on the other hand, there are frequent examples among men of the active powers of the mind remaining clear and vigorous when a fatal disease is “snuffing out the candle” of physical life, and the sensorial organs refusing to perform their functions: indeed these are often found in an inverse ratio to each other. The probability then is that the *ego* is not annihilated, that even the exercise of its faculties is not suspended; and, even if our faculties should become dormant for a time, as in sleep or syncope, it by no means follows that they are eternally extinct.

2nd. That it can be argued from the analogy of nature. But we observe life in animals, whether in man or in those of a lower scale of being, until what we call death intervenes. Vitality ceases in the body. Decomposition takes place. The particles of the once active frame become resolved to their primitive elements. But, from the observation of these circumstances, does analogy warrant us to draw the conclusion that *now* life is a nonentity? Certainly not. Does not an opposite supposition appear the more plausible? We continue to death, so we may continue beyond it. Animals cannot be traced after death, and, up to that time, the analogy is against the destruction of their living powers.

3rd. An appendix to the foregoing arguments might be presented thus: “We labour under primitive and lasting prejudices based upon the supposition that death is the destruction of living agents.” But the reason why such a presumption may harbor in the minds of some must arise from the false idea that a living being is composed of parts that can be divided; in short, that it is compounded of certain elements which are each capable of destruction; the whole fabric falling into ruins when death closes the scene. This, however, is not the case. Consciousness is simple and indivisible. It is no integer, which requires certain fractional parts to make it that unity. It is a whole, a mental monad: so must the