

conditions (UNEF I, ONUC, UNFICYP, UNEF II, UNDOF).* There are still five peace-keeping operations under UN control, including about 8,300 men from 23 countries. These are: UNEF II, UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNTSO and UNMOGIP.

Peace-keeping is not a sufficient objective in itself. It should normally create the conditions for the process of peace-making -- viz., the diplomatic search for solutions to the underlying causes of conflict. In this respect, the United Nations has been less successful. Disputes between India and Pakistan and in the Middle East and Cyprus have all proved sufficiently intractable over the years to thwart attempts to reach enduring political settlements. Instead they have tended to erupt into war periodically, even when the interests of the great powers would have favoured a resolution of the problem. In other instances, possible action by the United Nations has been inhibited by the unwillingness of some or all of the parties to the dispute to involve the organization --e.g., Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the situations in Vietnam and in Lebanon (1975-76). Despite these failures, it would be wrong to blame the UN for not doing its job. To rid the world of the use of organized violence is a long-term and perhaps impossible objective, especially when the number of states is increasing and population growth-rates put great strain on finite resources. The existence of nuclear weapons is a sobering disincentive to war. But the only solid deterrent is the determination of the great powers to act jointly to prevent or stop it, as the Charter prescribes. Until then, the UN can only advance as opportunity permits, taking advantage of crises to pioneer the practices of international peace-keeping and dispute settlement.

The major UN peace-keeping operations are in the Middle East and Cyprus. The UNEF is stationed between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai and the UNDOF between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan heights. UNEF is composed of about 4,000 troops from six countries and UNDOF of about 1,200 troops from four countries. Their costs are paid by the UN membership on the basis of a special scale and, while a few countries have refused to pay, the great majority accept this responsibility. In Cyprus, on the other hand, the Force is financed by voluntary contributions that fall far short of reimbursing the troop-contributors, including Canada, for their expenses (there are about 2,700 troops in Cyprus from seven countries). This is because certain members of the Security Council, including the U.S.S.R. and France, make it a condition of their approval of the mandate of the Force that it be financed in this way. This is certainly not satisfactory, but the alternative is the withdrawal of the Force and the probable resumption of fighting in Cyprus.

The UN has not been able to bring about peaceful settlements of the Cyprus and Arab-Israeli disputes. The members of the Security Council are divided about the shape these settlements should take, and even if they were to agree they could not be sure of obtaining the agreement of the parties. The Secretary-General has been given a mandate in each case to explore the prospects for a peaceful settlement, but he can do little without

* UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan), UNEF I (United Nations Emergency Force), UNOGIL (United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon), UNOC (United Nations Operation in the Congo), UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus), UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea), UNYOM (United Nations Yemen Observer Mission), UNIPOM (United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission), UNEF II (United Nations Emergency Force), UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force).