

with his level of existence. This is especially true in those regions where the traditional administrations have been disturbed or corrupted. In such situations, the idealism of the United States usually gains only intermittent contact. Infusions of American technology and economic aid, where they have not been bled off to corrupt officials and inefficiency, may materially benefit the peasant, but they will still have failed to give the recipient an awareness of his own innate integrity in the scheme of things; instead, the complexity or alienness of such infusions may serve to put him into a position of dependence on or inferiority to the alien donors.

### Mutual empathy

Between the Marxist ideal and the poor and the oppressed there exists a mutual empathy. The impoverished situation is explained not as one of failure but rather as one derived from a history of exploitation and oppression under colonial and capitalist regimes. Their own national governments are identified and discredited through their links with such powers. They become targets.

The theory gives the oppressed a place of integrity in the Marxist dialectic, a prescribed status in the class struggle, and a comprehensible motivation and aim to improve their material position. The means are active revolution. The theoretical reward is a twofold objective of equality of power and security of existence. Whether or not the methods are harsh or the ends occasionally abused, the ideology gives meaning, justification and integrity to those who accept it.

Where the existing regime is corrupt or weak, its excesses play into the hands of the revolutionaries, who become attractive by their relative asceticism and constancy of purpose. Equally, often as the result of the decolonization process, where centralized control is fragmented as in Angola, a hard-core movement with specific aims can rapidly gain power.

The clearly-specified aims and the enshrinement of revolutionary ideals provide a light in adversity that may serve in the end to attract the uncommitted. Thus, as in South Vietnam, where politicians, spiritual leaders and intellectuals attempted to establish a "third force" as an alternative to the corruption of the existing Thieu regime and the rigidity of revolutionary Marxism, they found the vagueness of their aims insufficient. Adversity and oppression either left them impotent, or drove them to the revolutionary PRG camp.

The strategy and tactics of Marxist-ideology movements have had much to do with the discrediting of the United States in military and moral terms. In both the industrialized and developing world, these revolutionary forces have sought to exterminate and replace existing non-socialist administrations. In the Third World, the insurrectionist forces have gained control through appeals to popular grievances, and by discrediting, eliminating and replacing local and regional appurtenances of the existing regime. The methods involve the murder or coercion of civilian targets such as educators, tax-collectors, and administrators. These are carried out as a prelude to, or as part of, a guerilla war.

The response of the target regimes has been critical. As the withdrawal of British and French power continued, a number of governments under internal pressure turned increasingly to the United States for aid. Often these regimes have not had a basis of wide popular support, or have seen such a basis eroded through the tactics of the revolutionaries. Where such regimes have been blatantly corrupted, the infusions of United States aid and military responses have achieved a dubious integrity in international terms.

United States military agencies have steadily assisted the existing authorities, as, for instance, by the Special Forces training given to the Bolivian security forces that eventually shot Che Guevara; however, the inability to respond appropriately can lead to the high-technology blunderbuss approach, as exemplified in Indochina. There, the casual overkill of air-power, artillery and armour did much to alienate rural populations that had not previously been converted by the coercion or attractiveness of revolutionary forces.

### Repulsive elements

In addition, intelligence operations such as the "Phoenix" program, which tried to counter the insurgent forces by using similar murder and coercion tactics, ended up as brutally repulsive elements supporting increasingly corrupted attenuations of the existing regime. Increasingly the character of the repression was seen as indiscriminately directed against the inhabitants in rural areas, a war of high-technology town against low-technology country. Only by a massive expenditure of human life and funds could semblances of control be exerted by the central regime.

The desire to gain an illusion of success for a high-technology but indiscriminating military machine has led to the frighteningly profligate use of "kill-ratio" or "conversion-ratio" statistics, which often

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