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strike against the U.S.-owned Johns-Manville Co. at Asbestos, sending in waves of Quebec Provincial Police (virtually a private Union Nationale army at the time) to break up picket lines and run through truckloads of scabs. Asbestos set a pattern that was to be repeated throughout in 1950's.

As a result, American capital came into Quebec on its own terms, and the wages of the French worker stayed well below that of his English counterpart. This was reflected in the educational system, or rather systems. English schools were better equipped, more scientifically oriented, and better financed. French schools were characterized by poor teaching and clerical control, at the lower levels, and by a stress on classical discipline like Greek and Latin, at the higher levels. Common professions for the better-off French were law, medicine, the clergy.

Those who sought decent-paying jobs learned English, and educated their children to speak English. This applied even to the French upper-middle class, because to be a corporation lawyer, for example, one had to speak English.

The Union Nationale government, despite the aggressive quasi-nationalist stance in favor of provincial autonomy that it frequently took against Ottawa, was a convenient ally for the English commercial and industrial elite. Since the government accepted the need to accommodate foreign capital and keep the mass of the population in a cheap labor pool, the St. James Street Boys were more than happy to fill the Union Nationale coffers at election time—another key part of the strange alliance behind Duplessis.

Class of Rois Negres

Thus, the English commercial and industrial bosses, and the branch managers of American capital, maintained their domination over the French population by supporting a native class of rois negres (former Le Devoir editor Andre Laurendeau's phrase, comparing the Quebec bourgeoisie to the black African chiefs who served colonialism).

To paraphrase Michel Chartrand: Capital spoke English, Labor spoke French, and the government was bilingual.

The Union Nationale was re-elected time and again as a result of the backing of the rural areas (Montreal was preponderantly Liberal). In return, it supplied material assistance such as farm loans, road development, telephones, and various forms of patronage. On the cultural level, they protected the farmers and the Church from the centralizing Liberal influence of Ottawa.

By the later Fifties, however, the shaky alliance was breaking down.

The labor movement grew in militance proportionate to Duplessis' repression, and became a powerful force by 1959. Quebec's intellectuals and professionals were discontented with government disregard for such liberal values as freedom of the press and labor's right to unionize. But most important, the needs of capital were changing: capital now demanded skilled labor and a government that provided technocrats to plan roads, hydroelectric power, and communications systems. It needed a new managerial elite.

The Quebec Liberal Party, meanwhile, was building the sort of team that would be able to reorient Quebec along these lines.

Maurice Duplessis, undisputed "Chef" of the Union Nationale for 23 years, died a quiet death in the Iron Ore Company of Canada's palatial guest house in Schefferville on September 18, 1959.

The Liberals, under former federal Northern Development and Natural Resources minister Jean Lesage, moved in with a promise to "open the window and air the place out." To the workers they promised reforms of the labor code, and a revamped social welfare scheme. To the intellectuals and young technocrats they promised educational reform. To the investors and corporations, they promised a smooth administration and a host of skilled managers and technocrats.

On June 22, 1960 the Union Nationale was defeated. Lesage was in, and he delivered on the promises. The notaries and small-town politicians were replaced by a new generation of technocrats— young sociologists, economists, engineers and planners from the universities and the corporations. It was called "The Quiet Revolution."

For two years, Quebec experienced a period of rising confidence, as labor leaders, students, and technocrats defined the needs of their own particular sectors. Confidence peaked with the 1962 election. It was fought on the issue of whether or not to nationalize the hydroelectric power companies. Natural Resources Minister Rene Levesque fought for nationalization, and won. Lesage broke out the election slogan that raised eyebrows in Ottawa: *Maitres Chez Nous*— Masters in Our Own House.

Quebec should produce its own engineers, set up its own laboratories, modernize its own schools, launch its own industries, and generally provide for the needs of its own people.

But while the government could give workers the right of collective bargaining, it could provide neither the wage hikes they demanded, nor security against price increases.

While it could draw the blueprint for educational reforms it could not pay for them.

The nationalization of Hydro may have seemed a proud moment, but it was perhaps not nationalization in the strict sense: Quebec bought the companies from the private interests that controlled them. But Quebec could not buy back all of its sold and stolen resources. The Liberals had come in on a wave of rising expectations, and briefly rode its crest, but in the end, they drowned.

Over sixty per cent of Quebec's industry is U.S.-owned. The rest is owned largely by interests in Britain and English Canada. Representative of this domination is one Canadian mining corporation, Toronto-based Noranda Mines Ltd., which controls a whole series of company towns across northern Quebec. In the largest and oldest of these, Rouyn-Noranda, Noranda and its subsidiary, Quemont Mines, employ 2200 of the 30,000 residents. When the city government wants to build a park, it has to get the company's approval—and grant it an option to take over the land whenever it wants. The local newspaper is owned outright by Noranda Mines. Attempts at farming in the area have all failed—because of the soot from Noranda's smelter.

McGILL FRANCAIS

The grip on Quebec is often more subtle, though it takes little effort to unearth. An example of how the economic domination of the American and Anglo-Canadian capitalists has perverted the social structure, and served the English (17 per cent of the population) at the expense of the French (83 per cent) comes from a suppressed study made by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The study, leaked last year to the Montreal daily *La Presse*, revealed that in Quebec, a Canadian of British origin, unilingual, earns an average yearly salary of \$5,502. But a bilingual British-Canadian earns an average of \$4,772. A bilingual French Canadian earns \$4,350 a year average, while a unilingual French Canadian earns \$3,099.

If effect, it means that a unilingual British-Canadian in Quebec earns \$1,152 more a year than a bilingual French Canadian.

Furthermore, a British-Canadian who is unilingual earns \$730 more than a fully bilingual British-Canadian in Quebec.

The report leaves unstated what this means for the idea of bilingualism as a solution to the "national problem", but it states the obvious conclusion itself: "In Quebec, it pays to not speak French."

The study further revealed that:

- Quebec is the only province in the country in which a unilingual British Canadian earns more than a bilingual one.
- Canadians of British origin have incomes 10 per cent higher than the average in every province, except in Quebec, where they earn 40 per cent more than the average.
- English managerial personnel in Quebec earn \$6,234 more than English workers, whereas French Canadian managers earn \$3,308 more than French Canadian workers.

It also shows that a French Canadian who goes to university will up his income less than an English, Jewish or Italian Canadian who goes to university (almost invariably English)—demonstrating the economic advantages of English education for immigrants.

Finally, of 14 national groups whose incomes were studied, the British earned the most, while the three lowest groups, from bottom up, were native Indians, Italians, and French Canadians.

Not only are the Quebecois, 83 per cent of the population, not Masters in their Own House, they are servants. And poorly-paid ones at that.

The Liberals had failed to deliver, and the Union Nationale, revamped by its leader, Daniel Johnson, began capitalizing on the frustrated expectations, and the Liberals' neglect of the rural areas. In June, 1966, the Liberals fell by a narrow margin to the Union Nationale, and the policy of low-wages to attract foreign capital returned. But there were some disturbing statistics in the election returns—*Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale*; 9 per cent.

Since 1963 the RIN, Quebec's first significant independence party in this century, had been building a base among those who intended to achieve the promise of *Maitres Chez Nous* in the only way that seemed feasible, given the Liberals' failure—through an independent Quebec. The first RIN members, according to surveys at the time, were

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